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PREFACE 
Presi dent Harry S. Truman is a man admired by the Jews as one of 
the greatest men of our century; the Arabs look on him as a betrayer of 
the principles of justice and democracy. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the development of 
Truman's foreign policy on Palestine between his entry into the White 
House in April, 1945 and the de facto recognition of the State of Israel 
in May, 1948. While there are many elements entering into the formation 
and implementation of a foreign policy , this paper deals only with those 
elements which directly affect the Palestine policy of President Truman. 
For this reason , United States foreign policy towards Great Britain, 
the ab countries , the United Nations , the United States Congress, and 
American public , will be discussed only as it affects Truman in his 
decisions toward the Jews and Palestine . 
The author has followed as near as possible a chronological 
presentation, with few exceptions. The exceptions are made in order to 
bring harmony in presentation of a particular point of view or incident. 
The first chapter treats the problem up to the time Truman came into 
the presidency. Chapters two and three discuss Truman's early attempt 
to solve the Palestinian problem and the establishing of the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry. The fourth chapter points out his 
assumption of some of Britain's responsibility under the mandate . 
Chapters five and six present American responsibility in the United 
Nations and Truman's influence leading to de facto recognition of the 
iii 
State of Israel. 
The source materials used in this study are, the Department of 
State Bulletin, the United Nations records, and the New York Times, all 
of which cover the period from April , 1945 to June, 1948. In addition 
the author, while in Independence, Missouri in December, 1959 interviewed 
Harry s. Truman and examined the Truman Papers which include letters, 
press releases, interoffice correspondence, and telegrams. In the first 
six months Truman was in Office, he received 200 telegrans dealing with 
the Jews and Palestine. In the spring and summer of 1946 Truman re-
ceived 13,800 telegrams in comparison to 17,300 in the r est of 1946 and 
1947. In the six months of 1948, including the recognition of the 
State of Israel, 24,400 telegrams were received by the President. The 
demands and requests usually centered on achieving an immediate goal: 
the immediate immigration of Jews into Palestine, specific conditions in 
Palestine, the arms embargo, the United Nations majority report and 
Jewish representation, keeping the Negev and Jerus~_em as a part of 
Israel, and the recognition of Israel. The long-range goal was to 
establish a National Jewish Homeland in Palestine . 
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PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S POLICY ON PALFSTINE; A STUDY OF PRESI ENTIAL POLICY 
WHICH LED TO DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL 
Edward Raymond Barels 
Harry s. Truman's foreign policy on Palestine was presented from 
his entry into the White House in April, 1945 to de facto recognition of 
the State of Israel in May , 1948. A chronological presentation of the 
materials found in the Truman Papers , Deoartment of State Bulletins , 
United Nations records, and New York Times, was followed except to bring 
harmony of presentation on a particular point of view or incident. 
Truman had humanitarian motives in mind for the displaced Jews of 
Europe while public opinion and a desire for votes made it possible for 
i mplementing a Jewish Homeland. The Harrison report led Truman to re-
quest the British Government to bring about the immigration of 100,000 
Jews into Palestine . In an attempt to find a just solution, Britain and 
the United States formed the Anglo-American Committee ~f Inquiry to 
investigate the situation. Truman, led by American public opinion and 
Congress to help the Jews, moved further into the Zionist position. 
Britain then turned the problem over to the United Nations , and Truman 
moved to the support of public opinion and created the State of Israel9 
Thus Truman in an attempt to solve the European refugee problem created 
the State of Israel as a refuge for European Jews, as a bulwark against 
communism in the Near ~ast , as an important strategic and economic state 
in the Near East favoring the west, and as an attempt to fill a vacuum 
created by the termination of the British Mandate , all at the expense of 
Arab- American friendship . 
CHAPTER I 
FORMATION OF A PALESTINE POLICY BEFORE 
THE TRUMAN AI.MINISTRATION 
On April 12, 1945, after serving only a few months of his fourth 
term in office, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died, leaving to 
Vice-President Harry s. Truman the full-grown problem of the Jews and 
Palestine. Truman was to attempt a solution to the problem of the 
Near East, which had proved to be too big for the presidents since 
World War I. Before examining Truman's policies, one should view the 
situation as it developed. 
Turkey, while governing Palestine during the first World War, 
fought against the Allied Powers. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916, France, Britain and Russia arranged a provisional formula for the 
division of the Turkish provinces as the spoils of war. The British 
Government, attempting to gain Jewish support under the Jtrain of losing 
the first World War, issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, 
stating that the British"• Government view with favour the establish-
ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people , and will use 
their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object •• 
While supporting the Jews, the British Government limited their promise 
to protect the Arabs and other groups in Palestine by saying that 
~alfour Declaration from The Times (London), November 9, 1917. 
"• nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights 
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 112 
The United States 1 reaction to the Balfour Declaration was not 
as definite as the Jews like to believe for neither Robert J. Lansing, 
Secretary of State nor President Thomas Woodrow vilson issued a formal 
statement. The Declaration was discussed and Lansing wrote Wilson 
explaining that in his judgment the government should go very slowly 
in announcing a policy for Palestine for three reasons. First, the 
United States was not at war with Turkey. Second, the Jews were not as 
a whole behind the establishment of Palestine as a homeland. Third, 
many Christian sects and individuals would resent turning absolute 
control over to the Jews.3 
On August 31, 1918, Wilson ignored Lansing's caution and wrote 
to Rabbi Stephen Samuel Wise, chairman of the United Appeal ; nd founder 
of the Zionist4 Organization of America, stating satisfaction in the 
progress of the Zionist Movement among the people of the United 
2 
~alfour Declaration from The Times (London), November 9, 1917. 
3Robert J. Lansing, Secretary of State, to Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 
President, December 13, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States; The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, Vol. II (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 71. 
4In the first half of the twentieth century, a Zionist was a Jew 
who laid stress on the resettlement of the Jews in Palestine as the 
center of social and religious influence for Judaism. It should be 
noted that not all Jews were Zionists and some were against this 
resettlement. 
States.5 The State Department refused to recognize the letter as an 
official declaration of policy, but the Zionists gained significance 
by their claim of Wilson's favoring a Jewish Homeland. 6 This was 
Wilson's first statement of policy because up to this time Palestine 
was not considered an American interest. 
3 
At the Peace Conference following the war, Wilson was caught 
between his principle of self-determination, which would leave Palestine 
to the Arabs, or a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, which had the support 
of some of his advisers and a Zionist lobby. But by March, 1919, 
President Wilson expressed his views to the Allied Nations that they 
should agree to lay a foundation for a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. 
Because of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the final settlement was left 
to the League of Nations and approval by the United States. Because 
5wilson to Stephen Samuel Wise, Former President of the Provisional 
Zionist Committee, August 31, 1918, Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace, Vol. 
I (New York: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1927), p. 24J. --
6Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palesti ne Relations 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press-, 1949), pp. 172-178. Hereinafter 
cited as Manuel, American-Palestine Relations. A divided executive 
policy on Palestine, with the Presidency and the State Department 
differing on many occasions, remained a characteristic of the American-
Palestine relations for the next thirty years. Manuel, American-Palestine 
Relations, p. 167. The formation of foreign policy, according to Presi-
dent Truman in an interview with the author (December 16, 1959), is 
solely in the hands of the President with the State Department implemen-
ting the policy since he is the one who knows what all departments are 
doing and can coordinate all of the executive departments in an unified 
policy. Usually, however, the President will ask the advice of departments 
before changing a policy, but this is unnecessary as we will see later. 
Elmer Plischke stated in Conduct of .American Diplomacy (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1950), p. 101, that President Truman appeared to 
have allowed his Secretaries to do more work on their own than under 
Roosevelt . 
the United States did not join the League of Nations , the former re-
tained the right of approval on the final settlement and any future 
changes in the Mandate by the League of Nations. In July, 1922, the 
League of Nations officially assigned Palestine to Great Britain as a 
Class A Mandate for the establishment of a Jewish National Home, while 
guaranteeing equality with the Arabs . Thus, the Balfour Declaration 
was incorporated into the Mandate. In the meantime the United States 
Congress was debating a resolution which was approved on September 21, 
1922, expres sing the view which Congress had held since the issuance 
of the Balfour Declarationo 
4 
That the United States of America favors the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of Christians and all other non- Jewish communi-
ties in Palestine, and that the holy places and relig~ous buildings 
and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected. 
Oil, in the Negev of southern Palestine , was one of the first 
major economic interests of the United States in the area. The Standard 
Oil Company of New York had a foothold in the country from an agreement 
with the Turkish government before World War I, but it was not until 
1920-1923 that negotiations with Britain were worked out. The approval 
of the United States on future changes in the Palestine Mandate led to 
an "open-dooru policy in the Near East. To further guarantee protection 
7The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, Vol. XLII, 
Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 1012. 
Hereinafter cited as Statutes at Large. 
of American rights in oil, business, and religious affairs, the United 
States formed with Britain the .Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 stating 
that: 
Nothing contained in the present Convention shall be affected 
by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, 
••• unless e~ch modification shall have been assented to by the 
United States. 
With this treaty the United States had a lever for negotiation in 
Anglo-Palestine relations in the coming years. 
5 
Many Jews went to Palestine in the early twenties, but during the 
late twenties Jewish immigration became slight while the Arab population 
grew in numbers. In 1927, the climax of three years of economic dep-
ression in Palestine, Jewish emigration exceeded immigration. The Arabs 
no longer considered the Zionist aims as much of a threat, and the 
Zionists lost much political prestige to the Arabs who seemed to gain 
economic and political strength by their development of the rich oil 
land with the help of foreign capital. 
With the rise of Adolf Hitler to power, modern Zionism reached a 
sharp turning point with Jews escaping the pogroms of Germany for life 
in Palestine. The Zionist movement in the United States supported by 
the Jews increased collections of funds to help Jews get out of Europe. 
8United States Congress, Senate, "Convention Defining the Rights 
of Nationals in Palestine. Signed December 3, 1924, 11 Treaties, Conven-
tions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United 
States of America and Other Powers, ~-ml, Vol. IV, United States 
Senate, Doc. 134, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1938), pp. 4227-4234; United States Treaty Series, 
No. 728; Statutes at Large, Vol. 44, Part 3, p. 2184. 
In 1931, Jewish immigration was 4,075 and in 1932, 9,553, an increase 
of 243 per cent. In 1933, Jewish immigration was 30,327, an increase 
of 318 per cent over the previous year . In the next two years Jewish 
immigration increased another 200 per cent and in 1935, 61,854 Jews 
entered Palestine with only 396 leaving. 9 
The Arab-Jewish conflict was brought to a head during the riots 
of 1936-1937 when the Arabs tried to control the Jewish settlements by 
calling a general strike which lasted six months. The purpose of this 
action was to bring about the prohibition of Jewish immigration, the 
transfer of Arab land to Jews , and the establishment of a national 
government, responsible to a representative council. At the end of the 
strike Britain, responsible for maintaining peace under the Mandate, 
6 
had about twenty thousand troops in Palestine and the effects of Arab 
strike was being felt in England. As a result, Lord Peel and a Royal 
Commission were sent by the British Government to Palestine t o carry out 
a thorough investigation of the existing conditions. The Commission's 
report, released in July, 1937, stated that the Arabs desired national 
independence and that they hated and had fear of the establishment of the 
Jewish National Home. The Peel Commission then recommended restrictions 
on land purchases by the Jews from Arabs, restrictions on Jewish immi-
gration, and a possible partitioning of the land between Arabs and Jews. 10 
9Published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. Palestine; 
Study of Jewish , Arab, and British Policies, Vol. II (New Haven: Yale 
University Press , 1947), pp. 674-675 . Hereinafter cited as Esco, Pales-
tine; Study. --
10 
Esco , Palestine;~ Stud.y. pp . 717-722 , 792-798, 819-826 . 
7 
From the time of President Wilson the State Department held the 
position that the Jewish National Home provision was not an American 
interest. The first important American diplomatic intervention on 
Palestine came in the summer of 1937. A form of partition between Arab 
and Jew areas might conceivably affect United States interests as de-
fined in the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924. On July 6, 1937, the American 
Ambassador, Robert Worth Bingham, asked the British Government whether 
the United States Government would be consulted with respect to innova-
tions which might be proposed by British Government in Palestine as a 
consequence of the Report of the Royal Commission. The British continued 
to state that for the purpose of protection of American interests they 
would keep the United States posted on what they were going to do in 
Palestine . 11 
The British Government adopted the Peel Commission's recommendations 
but the Arabs rejected the recommendations and the Arab rebellion was 
resumed. The Zionists, on the other hand, accepted the i d a of partition 
in principle and stood ready to negotiate the recommendations . In 1938, 
the Woodhead Commission left for Palestine from London and reported con-
flicts in details with the Peel Commission, and the principle of parti-
tioning was abandoned for a time. The Arabs refused to meet the Jews 
at a round table and, in 1939 , the British Government issued the famous 
White Paper with a new policy towards alestine . 
1¾1anuel, American-Palestine Relations, p. 305 . 
8 
The White Paper of 1939 favored, in many respects, the Arab posi-
tion of establishment of an independent Palestine in ten years. The 
Arabs would be the predominant group, while a Constitution would have to 
be worked out to assure the Jews' rights in the National Home. In the 
meantime, Jewish immigration and settlement on the land would be re-
stricted. In the next five years 75,000 Jews could enter Palestine, and 
after that the consent of the Arabs would be needed. Along with limiting 
immigration, the Jews could buy only a small fraction of the land. Since 
the White Paper was not endorsed by either Jews or Arabs, Palestine re-
mained as a police state under British control. 
Therefore, if the Jews could escape the pogroms in Germany, they 
were not allowed to enter Palestine. With the near extinction of Jews 
in Europe, the center of the Zionist Movement shifted to the United 
States with its five million Jews and the support of Christians. Polish 
and German Jews were being killed by the thousands. Without t heir con-
fiscated property, the few who remained could only give mo1al support 
to Zionist aims. The National Home had b ecome more dependent upon the 
Jews in the United States who were the largest and wealthiest in the 
world. Thus, any changes in the Zionist program would require American 
Zionist support. 
In 1941, many Jewish organizations in the United States appointed 
a committee to draw up new aims for the Zionists. The program encouraged 
settlement, the control of immigration, the achievement of freedom, and 
self-government by establishing a Jewish state, and the termination of 
a minority people dependent on the will and pleasure of other nations. 
9 
Six hundred delegates at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City in May, 
1942, stated these principles and that the majority of American Zionis ts 
were in agreement with the program. The movement was called the Biltmore 
Program. The American acceptance of this program led the Inner Zionists 
General Council at Jerusalem in November, 1942, to approve a separate 
state instead of co-existence with the Arabs in, and under, the same 
state govern.ment. From this date few Jewish organizations wanted 
. t 12 co-exis ence. 
President Roosevelt, spending more and more time on war responsi-
bilities, had permitted the problem of Palestine to drop into the back-
ground; but the problem of the European Jew was still under consideration. 
David K. Niles, special adviser to the president on minority affairs, 
had become an executive assistant to the president after the 1940 
election. Niles, in addition to his other duties, was given the Palestin-
ian problem for briefing. Niles was later to hold the same position 
under the Truman administration.13 
In December, 1942, the American Palestine Committee, composed of 
hundreds of United States Senators, Representatives, cabinet members, 
12J. c. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., Inc., 195~ pp. 157-164. Hereinafter cited as Hurewitz, 
Struggle for Palestine. 
13Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel? (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 93-94. Hereinafter cited as Lilienthal, -.Jhat Price 
Israel? Alfred Steinberg, "Mr. Truman's 1·\ystery Man, 11 Sa turda.y Evening 
Post, Vol. 22, December 24 , 1949, p. 23. When Truman followed Roosevelt, 
the Palestine issue was again given to Niles. Some think that he was the 
man who won the independent state for the Jews. New York Times, September 
29, 1952, p. 23. 
Governors and other influential people, called on Roosevelt to back the 
Jewish Homeland and presented him with a joint statement signed by 
14 sixty-three Senators and one hundred and eighty one Congressmen. 
While not all American Jews favored a Jewish state, there was 
unity in their desire to help the European Jewish survivors who might 
wish to settle in Palestine after the war. With this object in mind 
10 
the Zionists gained Jewish support and a favorable section of American 
public opinion. To slow down the effectiveness of the Zionists propaganda, 
the Arabs and their supporters engaged in counterpropaganda, and the Arab 
governments brought diplomatic influence to bear upon Washington. The 
Zionist and Arab pressures came at the same time the British were seek-
ing full-scale American cooperation in Palestine and at the same time the 
United States interest in the Near East was growing. These four factors 
involved the United States more directly in the Palestine problem. 15 
With the Jews fleeing Germany for their lives they would have 
immigrated to other countries besides Palestine, but the Zionist aims 
were for Palestine alone. Stories were started in Europe that worse 
pogroms were taking place in the United States and Latin .America. 
Though Roosevelt was willing to see a l arge number of Jews enter t he 
United States as an asylum, he felt that Congress would be against it 
because of the pressure from the Zionists. He suggested Canada, Australia, 
14Lilienthal, What Price Israel? p. 92; Esco, Palestine;! Study, 
pp. 1011-1012. 
15Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, pp. 212-213. 
and other South American countries , but the Zionists maintained that 
16 Palestine was the only place for the Jews to go. 
11 
In the Presidential race of 1944, both parties stated in their 
platforms that they favored Palestine being made into a Jewish Homeland. 
The Democratic plank stated that "we favor the opening of Palestine to 
unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as 
to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish 
Commonwealth. 1117 Both Roosevelt and future Vice-President Truman were 
in agreement . Roosevelt said that "efforts will be made to find appro-
priate wczys and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable . 1118 
Before the Second World War, President Roosevelt believed that the 
fair solution of the Palestine problem would be direct negotiations of 
Arabs and Jews . He planned to persuade King Ibn Saud [Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Abdur Rahman al Faisal Al Said] of Saudi Arabia to find a favorable way 
for negotiations . King Ibn Saud did not consider the United States as 
imperialistic as the British or French . Therefore, Unit0d States 
mediation would be the most direct way for a solution. Then came World 
War II , but Roosevelt did not abandon this idea. At the conclusion of 
the Crimean conference, in the early winter of 1945, Roosevelt had a 
personal conference with King Ibn Saud on the American warship upon which 
the President was traveling. On April 5, Roosevelt summed up the 
16Lilienthal, What Price Israel? pp. 32-JJ . 
17New York Times, July 21 , 1944, P• 12. 
18New York Times , October 16 , 1944, p. 19 . 
decisions in a letter to King Ton Saud stating that 11 no decision be 
taken with respect to the basic situation on that country [Palestine ] 
without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. 1119 
Roosevelt wanted to keep the support of the Arab countries 
because United States companies had been in full control of petroleum 
12 
in Saudi Arabia, and partial control in Kuwait and Iraq. About half of 
the Middle East production was in the hands of United St a tes companies 
who had invested about $1,250,000,000. Arabs had good spokesmen in the 
United States because of the American petroleum companies trying to 
protect their investments. Consequently, Roosevelt's position was for 
the establishment of an independent state, a National Home for the Jews 
and Jewish refugees of Europe. Also, at the same time, Roosevelt 
advocated restricting immigration only if economic conditions within the 
country required it, and establishing individual liberty and security 
to all minority groups. 20 
Therefore, when Truman became President, the Uni t~d States was 
sitting in a precarious position in the Near East. First, the Anglo-
American Treaty included the United States on any modification of the 
British Mandate. Second, the United States was in partial control of the 
vital petroleum in the area. Third, the Jews in the United States were 
19sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1946), pp. 264-266. Hereinafter cited as Welles, Where Are We Heading? 
United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, October 25, 1945, 
p. 623. 
2°welles, Where Are We Heading? pp. 264-266. 
13 
pushing for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine . Fourth, President Roosevelt 
according to election promises and Congress were supporting a Jewish 
National Home . Fifth, Europe had a large number of refugees and Jews 
who needed immediate attention. And sixth, the war had so disrupted 
former policies that the United States had no clear cut policy for 
Palestine . Thus the big question remained, what would Truman do. 
CHAPTER II 
FORMATION OF A PALESTINE POLICY IN THE 
EARLY TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
The Palestine situation was a major problem facing the United 
States at the time of Roosevelt's death, and, as we have seen, President 
Truman did not inherit a clearly formulated Palestine policy. On the 
one hand, Congress felt the pro-Zionist pressures of American public 
opinion formed by the Jewish persecution in Europe, and on the other 
hand, the State and War Departments were concerned about strategic and 
economic interests in the Near East. 
The question of which way President Truman would proceed in 
supporting either Jews or Arabs was of paramount importance. Before the 
new President was well situated in his executive position, Edward R. 
Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State , sent the President a letter offering 
to brief him on the Palestine problem before he was app cached by either 
Jews or Arabs . Stettinius asked Truman to reject any commitments because 
the United States had vital interest in the Near East. According to 
Stettinius, the Palestine problem had resulted in a general 11 tenseness 11 
of the whole area, and the subject was to be 11 handled with the greatest 
care and with a view to long-range interest of the country. 111 
1Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 132-lJJ. Hereinafter cited as 
Truman, Years of Trial; Harry s. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955):-p. 69. Hereinafter 
cited as Truman , Decisions. 
15 
Two days after the Stettinius letter, Stephen S. Wise , chainnan 
of the American Zionist Emergency Council, stopped at the White House to 
talk about the Jews in Europe and the problem of resettlement. This 
conversation led to discussion about a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
Though Truman had before him the records and statements of fonner 
President Roosevelt on Palestine, and Stettinius' letter, President 
Truman felt that something could be worked out while protecting America's 
long-range interest and helping the Jewish victims of Europe. The 
President, however, assured the Zionists that he would uphold the pre-
election promises of Roosevelt and the Democratic party. Truman then 
assured the Arabs that he would follow Roosevelt's pledges to the Arabs 
about advanced consultation on Palestine. 2 
The President also thought that the United Nations should even-
tually assume the responsibility for the Palestine problem, but quick 
action was immediately needed to help the suffering European displaced 
persons. The State Department also agreed that the U1,.Lted Nations was 
the proper body to treat the Palestine issue, and that "no decision re-
2Truman in Decisions, p. 69 stated, "Since I was in agreement with 
the expressed policy of the Roosevelt administration on Palestine, I 
told Rabbi Wise that I would do everything possible to carry out that 
policy. I had carefully read the Balfour Declaration, in which Great 
Britain was committed to a homeland in Palestine for the Jews I had 
familiarized myself with the history of the question of a Jewish home-
land and I read over the whole record up to date, about some of the views 
and attitudes assumed by the 'striped-pants boys' in the State Department. 
It seemed to me that they didn't care enough about what happened to the 
thousands of displaced persons who were involved." J.C. Hurewitz, The 
Struggle for Palestine (New York : W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950), 
p. 226. Hereinafter cited as Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine. 
16 
garding it [Palestine] should be taken without full consultation with 
both Jews and Arabs. 113 
Two weeks after the Stettinius letter, Joseph Clark Grew, Acting 
Secretary of State in Stettinius' absence, sent a memorandum informing 
the President that while Roosevelt had given assurances sympathetic to 
Zionist aims, he had given equal assurance to the Arabs that nothing 
would be done without their consent.4 
Attempting to help the European Jews, the President, on June 22, 
sent Earl Grant Harrison, the American representative on the former 
Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, to Europe to investigate the 
problem of the homeless Jew, to determine their emigration preferences 
and the general needs of the displaced persons.5 
In July, thirty-seven Governors petitioned the Executive to dis-
cuss the problem of Jewish immigration at the coming Big Three [Great 
Britain, Soviet Union, and the United States] meeting. The petition 
stated: 
We believe that the time has come when concrete measures must be 
taken to open the doors of Palestine to Jewish mass immigration and 
colonization, and to bring about the earliest transformation of that 
country into a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth and we most 
earnestly urge;}OU to take such action as will contribute to this 
end. 
3Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 134, 140. 
4 Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 132-lJJ. 
5Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, p. 226; United States Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, October 21, 1945, p. 623. Hereinafter cited 
as Bulletin. 
In any- steps which, Mr. President, you may take to bring about 
the realization of this program we desire to assure you that you 
can rely upon the approgation of the .American people and count on 
our individual support. 
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Other petitions came to the President's desk urging him to "insist 
upon Mr. Churchill's carrying out of his country's pledge" for a Jewish 
Homeland. The petitions also stated that the Arabs who opposed Jewish 
immigration did not represent the true wishes of the Arabs as a whole. 
They included "that the closing of Palestine to Jewish immigration is 
derogation [sic . ] of the Atlantic Charter; that it is a unilaterial 
breach of the Anglo-,-\merican treaty of 1924 on the part of England and 
a breach of the terms of the mandate. 117 They recalled that the Democratic 
party platform, which the President had helped frame, as well as the 
Republicans , favored unrestricted Jewish immigration. Thirty State Legis-
latures had denounced the White Paper of 1939 and wanted the establish-
ment of a Jewish commonwealth. The Zionists were bringing pressures to 
bear from every source and with every argument that would help to establish 
a Jewish Homeland. 8 
At the Big Three's Berlin Conference, Truman discussed the Pales-
6New York Times, July 5, 1945, p. 14. 
7New York Times, July 19, 1945, p. 12. 
~ew York Times, July 19, 1945, p. 12. The "going [for the Jews] 
became easier" after Truman took office. "The successor to F[ranklin] 
D[elano] R[oosevelt] we are told was a far less complex personality than 
his illustrious predecessor - less ardroit and sophisticated, simpler and 
more straight-forward. He accepted the Zionist line reluctantly and under 
pressure, at first, but having accepted it, he followed through honestly 
and firmly." Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel? (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1953), p. 93. Hereinafter cited as Lilienthal, What Price 
Israel? 
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tine issue with Britain's former Prime Minister Winston Leonard Spencer 
Churchill and Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee, 9 but not with 
· Joseph Stalin, [Iosif Visserionivich Dzugashvili], the Soviet Union's 
Secretary-General of the Supreme Soviet, because he could do nothing 
about it. Truman did not want to send a military force overseas to 
keep peace in Palestine, because of Congressional opposition, a desire 
to limit American military commitments overseas, and because American 
public opinion wanted a rapid return of American soldiers. However, with-
in the limits of this policy, Truman favored free and open immigration to 
Palestine . This view was expressed by him in a press conference on 
August 16, when in reply to the direct question "What is the American 
position on Palestine?" he said that as many Jews as possible should be 
10 allowed to enter Palestine as long as peace was preserved. 
The Jews appreciated the Presidential statement supporting the 
Jewish desire to reestablish their National Home in Pales tine. The 
9The Anglo-American program for Palestine had been developed in 
principle under Roosevelt and Churchill. Roosevelt's death in April, 
1945, ended the personal collaboration between the two l eaders. Truman 
informed Churchill on July 24, that he wanted to discuss Palestine at 
the Conference, but before a reply could be given Churchill lost the 
British election by a Labor victory, with Attlee as Prime Minister. The 
note was acknowledged, promising that it would receive attention. Neither 
Attlee nor Truman had the experience or solution to the Palestine problem. 
Churchill accompanied Attlee to the Big Three as an adviser, because 
Churchill knew better what the governing principles had been. Hurewitz, 
Struggle for Palestine, pp. 225-226. 
10New York Times, August 17, 1945, p. 8; Hurewitz , Struggle for 
Palestine, pp. 226-227. "Mr. Truman's outline of his policy was seen 
by some observers as in itself going a step beyond the official British 
attitude, which as far as is known, is still based on the 1939 White 
Paper limiting Jewish immigration." New York Times, August 17, 1945, 
P• 8. 
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Jewish Agency claimed that they must be included on equal footing to all 
discussions and negotiations with all national governments and that 
Zionists wanted to form a majority in Palestine, hold free elections, 
let majority rule operate in the country, and follow the tradition of 
American democracy before it was too late.11 
The Arabs warned Truman that support of the Zionist's aims for 
immigration into Palestine might set off a new crusade between Christian-
ity and Islam. During the Second World war the Arabs claimed they had 
placed their trust in the United States. President Truman was reminded 
by Abdl-al-Rahman Bey Azzaro, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, 
of "the last promise made to the Arabs [King Ton Saud] by the great and 
lamented President Roosevelt" before his death, stating that Roosevelt 
would not support the Zionist cause against the Arabs in Palestine.12 
Emir Abdul Illah, Regent of Iraq, stated that Iraq would not agree to 
an increase immigration into Palestine and therefore could not accept 
Truman's views on the establishment of a Jewish lational Home in a 
country which is holy to three different religions - Islam, Judaism, 
and Christianity.13 
By the middle of 1945, Soviet Russia was showing a tendency to-
ward expansion into the Middle East. The suspicions of a widening gulf 
11New York Times, August 18, 1945; August 23, 1945, p. 10. 
12tturewitz, Struggle for Palestine, p. 229. 
13New York Times, August 29, 1945, p. 11. 
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separating the East and Wes t were confirmed by the Potsdam Conference in 
August, 1945. Therefore, British opposition to the Soviet Union in the 
area became the theme of policy thinking. With this came the idea that 
supporting the Jewish state in Palestine might produce a war with the 
Arabs and endanger the British strategic position and American interests. 
President Truman saw Palestine in the light of a refuge for 
European Jews and of public opinions. Zionism in the United States was 
supported on humanitarian grounds, and the five million American voting 
Jews, in the urban areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and California, 
were in sympathy with the Zionist aims. Being almost unopposed by any 
14 other pressure groups, the politicians gave them their support. 
Some Americans saw in Zionism a progressive movement that would 
form a beginning in the Near East in which the United States could work 
towards an introduction of a higher standard of living. A Jewish state 
would help break down the old Arab feudal political and s ocial systems 
which would be replaced by modern industrialism. Truman saw it this way. 
The great prosperity of the United States could give to the Near East 
a gigantic development program patterned after the Tennessee Valley 
14Whether or not the Jewish vote could be considered as a solid 
bloc was beside the point, for politicians approached Zionism with the 
presupposition of a solid bloc with sympathic supporters. Lilienthal, 
What Price Israel? pp. 109-120; Sumner \ elles in ·where Are We Heading? 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 266 stated: "Unfortunately, 
the policy assumed by the United States after Mr . Truman had succeeded 
to the Presidency proved neither constructive nor helpful. The pro-
nouncements coming from the White House and State Department can only 
have been made because of the belief that they would be politically 
advantageous in their effect upon the Jewish communities in the United 
States." 
Authority "so that a great industrial system could be S!:3t up under the 
Jews, and the productive potential of this region could be used to the 
mutual benefits of the Jews and Arabs. 1115 
Other Americans had difficulty justifying the wholesale removal 
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of the indigenous Arab population and tended to support bi-nationalism.16 
On August 31, 1945, President Truman received a report from Earl 
G. Harrison describing the deplorable conditions of the displaced persons 
in Europe. The report described the need for food, clothing, homes, and 
the terrible conditions of the concentration camps. Most of the 100,000 
remaining Jews wanted to leave Germany for Palestine because their chances 
of being admitted to the United States or other western countries seemed 
limited, if not impossible. Mr. Harrison suggested that with the Jewish 
plight "some reasonable extention or modification of the British White 
Paper of 1939 ought to be possible without too serious reprecussions." 
The Jewish Agency of Palestine was aware that the immigration quota would 
be exhausted in August, 1945, and had submitted ~0 the British Government 
a petition that 100,000 Jews be allowed to enter Palestine. Harrison 
also urged a quick evacuation of Jews because it was inhuman to have them 
live for any period of time under the horrible conditions of war stricken 
Europe. The army could easily have moved these Jews to new areas, in-
15Truman, Years of Trial, p. 156. 
16Freda Kirchwey, "The Palestine Inquiry," The Nation (New York), 
Vol. 162, January 12, 1946, p. 33; Robert F. Wagner, 11Palestine--A orld 
Responsibility, 11 The Nation (New York), Vol. 161, September 15, 1945, 
pp. 247-249; Irving F. Stone, "Palestine Pilgrimage," The Nation (New 
York), Vol. 161, December 8, 1945, pp. 615-617. 
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eluding Palestine.17 
That same day, the President wrote two letters dealing with the 
Harrison Report. In the first letter containing the Harrison Report , 
to General of the European Army, Dwight David Eisenhower, the Chief 
Executive asked Eisenhower to improve the conditions in the refugee 
camps, especially for the remaining Jews. On October 8, Eisenhower 
stated the changes taking place in regard to the displaced persons, 
especially the Jews, in regard to food, living quarters, and hospitali-
zation, which had helped "in saving the lives of Jewish and other con-
centration camp victims. 11 But there was still much to do in the future. 
Even at the time of the Harrison Report, efforts were being made to help 
th N . . t· 18 e azi vie ims. 
In the second letter to Prime Minister Attlee , Truman recommended 
that "as many as possible of the non-repatrible Jews, who wish it," be 
evacuated to Palestine. This letter recommended that the British Govern-
ment grant that an additional 100,000 Jews be allowed to enter Palestine .19 
The British faced the problem of whether to maintain the 1939 
White Paper regulations or establish a new policy. Before the Truman-
Attlee letter, the Cabinet had already considered draft plans submitted 
' l 7Bulletin, Vol. 13, October 21, 1945, p. 623 . This report was 
released to the press on October 18, 1945. 
18 Bulletin, Vol. 13, September 30, 1945, pp. 455-456; October 21, 
1945, pp. 607-609. 
19Bulletin, Vol. 13, November 18, 1945, PP• 790-791; Truman, Years 
of Trial, pp. 138-139. This letter was made public in the United States 
by Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa on September 13, 1945. 
by a Cabinet subcommittee on the future of Palestine, and had asked the 
United States to assume joint responsibility which was refusedo The 
White Paper of 1939 was to remain in force as stated in the draft with 
the exception that immigration would continue at a monthly maximum of 
1,500. However, no final decision had been reached when the Truman 
23 
letter arrived. The British Government, while sharing Trwnan's feelings 
in the matter, was displeased with Truman's interference in British 
foreign policy. The Cabinet had made no changes in the general situation 
except possibly including the United States in settling the Palestine 
problem. On September 16, Attlee answered the Truman letter by requesting 
the United States to send warships and planes to the Near East if fighting 
should break out over a new revised policy. The British Government 
believed that possibly the executive committee of the United Nations 
might discuss the subject of the Palestine and the European Jewish pro-
blem if the United States refused to help. 20 
In a press conference on September 26 , Presi~ent Truman tried to 
be open minded on the Palestine problem, but denied that Roosevelt had 
made any commitments to King Ibn Saud not to support the Jewish claims. 
Truman said that he had been through the records of the foreign con-
ference and found no such commitment. 21 
20New York Times, September 23 , 1945, p. 17; September 25, 1945, 
p. l; October 2, 1945, p. 8 . 
21New York Times, September 27, 1945, p. 14. It seems that resi-
dent Truman overlooked the Roosevelt letter at this time. Other state-
ments of this type are common. If there was no record of acy pledge, he 
would not be bound to such an understanding. New York Times, August 20, 
P• 17; August 28, 1945, p . 15. 
Since Truman, in a strong pro-Zionist posit~on, rejected know-
ledge of Roosevelt's April 5 letter for advanced consultation, the 
British Government restated its position for a joint Anglo-American 
responsibility. The White House received other letters from Prime 
Minister Attlee, but Truman refused to comment on them explaining that 
he wished first to talk with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who 
had left for London. 22 
24 
After the release to the public of the Harrison Report, and 
letters to Attlee and Eisenhower of August Jl, the Arab leaders of Iraq 
and Azzam Bay were quick to remind the United States of Roosevelt's 
letter of advanced consultation. The abs did not believe that Zionism 
was the means of solving the world-wide Jewish problem. Any support 
given by the United States to Zionism would be an act directed against 
the Palestine Arabs, the legitimate owners of Palestine. The note further 
stated that "any support given Zionism is deemed an act directed against 
Iraq in particular and the Arab people in general. 11 ;,.j Sixty-four year old 
Emir Abdullah Ibn Hussein , ruler of Trans-Jordan, stated that he had 
written to both Roosevelt and Truman about Palestine in order to "pre-
vent calamities which will be inevitable if the situation further 
deteriorates. 1124 He claimed that he received replies from both that no 
22New York Times, October 3, 1945, p. 4· ' October 4, 1945, p. 4. 
23New York Times, October 4, 1945, P• 4; October 5, 1945, p . 2. 
24New York Times, October 23, 1945, p. 9. 
final decision would be taken before the Arabs had been consulted. 
While Byrnes was at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, 
he took the position "that the matter is of such importance that Presi-
dent Truman himself must handle American policy in connection with it 
[Palestine]. 1125 The British Government did not want to turn Palestine 
over to United Nations trusteeship in the near future, indicating that 
possibly President Truman was willing to commit the United States to 
Palestinian responsibility in a financial way, or else he would not be 
doing all he could to help the European Jews. 
The Arabs were not content with the releasing of Roosevelt's 
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April 5 letter. Izzat George Tannosis, head of the Arab office in London, 
stated that President Truman made no attempt to consult the Arab leaders 
in Palestine before issuing his recommendation for 100,000 Jews to enter 
Palestine. An attempt to use force would be very un-American. 26 Al 
Balagh, Egyptian Nationalist newspaper, accused Truman of following 
a policy which contradicted his statements. The newspaper also charged 
that Truman's attitude endangered lm1erican economic interests in the 
Near East, embarrassed England with needless difficulties, and disturbed 
world peace and security in the Arab world. 27 
Public opinion was again directed to the White House for the 
increase in Jewish immigration and for providing hope for the European 
25New York Times, October 7, 1945, P• 17. 
26New York Times, November 10, 1945, p. 6. 
27New York Times, October 23, 1945, P• 9. 
Jew. President Truman, in an interview with Joseph Meyer Proskaver, 
president, and Jacob M. Blaustein, chairman of the Executive Committee 
of the American Jewish Committee, said that "he was using the influence 
of the United States in an effort to obtain a prompt and substantial 
increase in the number of certificates for Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. 1128 Blaustein and Proskaver said that the problem should be 
handled in a humanitarian wczy and that political questions29 should be 
put in a secondary place.30 
In Chicago a mass meeting that filled Chicago Stadium approved 
a resolution directed to Attlee, that England live up to the Balfour 
Declaration. As a result, thousands of individuals at this meeting 
signed prepared postcards to President Truman urging him to help the 
European Jews.31 Seventeen members of the House of Representatives 
praised the President in his stand to let 100,000 Jews into Palestine 
and accused Britain of not living up to the 1924 agreement.32 
26 
At a conference of two thousand delegates of the United Jewish 
Appeal, the delegates adopted a resolution asking that Truman create an 
international agency with the power to recover European Jewish property 
28New York Times, September JO, 1945, P• 39. 
29The two explained that reference to political questions were 
to the idea of whether or not Palestine should receive statehood. The 
American Jewish Committee still held to a co-existence trusteeship. 
30New York Times, September 30, 1945, p. 39. 
31New York Times, October 16, 1945, p. 12; October 17, 1945, p. 8. 
32congressional Record, ?9th Congress, 1st Session, PP• 9675-9699. 
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lost to Nazi Germaey, and use the funds for relief and resettlement of 
surviving Jews of Europe . 33 
In early October, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes asked Truman 
to allow the publication of Roosevelt's April 5 letter thinking that it 
11would make it plain to the American public that we would not endorse the 
Zionist prograrn. 1134 Byrnes also wanted Truman to issue a statement re-
affirming the Roosevelt position. Though Truman authorized the pub-
lication of the letter, he refused to make a statement indicating it was 
not necessary because it was a United Nations matter. The letter was 
released on October 18 by Byrnes with his statement that the American 
government "would not support a final decision which in its opinion would 
affect the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with 
both Jews and Arabs . "35 
The letters between Attlee and Truman continued. On October 19, 
the British Government made a proposal to the State Department for an 
Anglo- American Commission of Inquiry. While no det~ils were immediately 
forthcoming about the Commission, it brought an end to arguments that the 
United States was free with advice but refused to take responsibility. 
There were a strong number of left wing Labor party members still support-
ing the party's platform for a national home for Jews in Palestine and 
looked forward to American help . But as a whole, the British Government 
33New York Times, October 22, 1945 , p. 2. 
34Truman, Years of Trial, p. 140. 
35Bulletin , Vol . 13 , October 21, 1945, p. 62J; Truman, Years of 
Tr ial , p . 140. 
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admired the offer of the United States to help settle the Palestine 
problem.36 
On November 13, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, announced in the 
House of Commons the agreement of the United States and Britain to a 
joint inquiry into the whole problem of the European Jews and Palestine. 
Until the committee's recommendations were given to the two Governments, 
Jewish immigration into Palestine was to be terminated. President Truman 
also announced the United States' acceptance to determine the facts in 
the Palestine issue, and make interim and long-range recommendations. 
Truman stated that the 
Establishment of this committee will make possible a prompt 
review of the unfortunate plight of the Jews in those countries in 
ope where they have been subjected to persecution and a prompt 
examination of questions related to the rate of current immigration 
into Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country. 
The situation faced by displaced Jews in Europe during the coming 
winter allows no delay in this matter. I hope the committee ~ 71 be able to accomplish its important task with the greatest speed. 
The Chief Executive had received word f rnm Stephen S. Wise and 
Abba Hillel Silver, joint chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency 
Council, on October 30, that "what is urgent]y needed is not another 
roving expedition or a further time-consuming investigation, but 
36New York Times, October 25, 1945, p. 6; October 26, 1945, P• l; 
l ovember 1, 1945, p;T; ovember 8, 1945, p. 2; Hurewitz in the Struggle 
for Palestine, pp. 230-231, states that as a result of dissention with 
Soviet Russia at the council of Foreign Ministers, the British feared 
the Russian motives in the Near East. This is what led Attlee to suggest 
a compromise between British and American positions in a joint investi-
gation. 
37New York Times, November 14, 1945, PP• 1, 13. 
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immediate concrete measures. 1138 If there was going to be a joint in-
quiry, they recommended four considerations. First, immediate admission 
of 100,000 Jews into Palestine as an urgent necessity. Second, the White 
Paper of 1939 should be abandoned since the United States did not approve 
of the terms stated in the mandate. Third, the purpose should be in line 
with the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine mandate. Fourth, both 
countries should cooperate in the implementation of the announced policy. 
After the Truman and Bevin announcement, Wise and Silver accused Truman 
of having "fallen into a carefully prepared trap" of the British Govern-
ment.39 
Congress and other Jewish organizations thought the same as 
Wise and Silver. Another investigation added to the previous ones 
would only be time consuming when time was of the utmost importance 
for saving the European Jews. Many inquiries arrived from Jewish 
sympathizers as to when the commission would have to make its report. 
The Zionists referred to Truman's accepting the Angl -American Inquiry 
as a betrayal to which they would not submit. The Arabs were also in 
opposition to an Anglo-American Inquiry because it might supercede 
38wise and Silver to Truman, October JO, 1945, in Truman, Years 
of Trial, p. 144. 
39New York Times, November 14, 1945, p. 13; November 15, 1945, 
p. 4; Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 143-144. The author will follow the 
correspondence of Wise and Silver to Truman because while most all mail 
coming to the White House on the Jewish problem was turned over to Niles 
for handling, Truman personally handled the Wise-Silver correspondence, 
with few exceptions. It is for this reason that this correspondence 
will be more fully covered in this place and in the following pages. 
The degree of influence is difficult to determine. 
JO 
the White Paper of 1939 by opening land purchases and irnmigration.40 
In conclusion, the Anglo-American Committee marked the f i rst 
important change in American policy toward Palestine. Before this time 
America had given advice freely, but now they were called upon to accept 
responsibility and give practical assistance. As Truman stated, "one of 
our main problems was that Palestine was not ours to dispose of. 1141 The 
administration won support through speeches and resolutions favoring 
Zionism. This had come about mainly because of the humanitarian agree-
ments to help the surviving European Jews as quickly as possible. Truman 
felt "the aims and goals of the Zionist at this stage to set up a Jewish 
state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding means to 
relieve the human misery of the displaced persons. 1142 
It now seemed that President Truman's request for t he admission 
of 100,000 European refugees was a grave tactical error. While gaining 
the support of the Jews, the Arabs had turned to the British Government 
for help.43 Truman, by allowing himself to be drawn into the investi-
40New York Times, November 18, 1945, p. 15; November 22, 1945, p. 
48; November 28, 1945, p. 14; December 4, 1945, p. 9. 
41 Truman, Years of Trial, p. 144. 
42 Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 144-145. 
43The Israeli terrorists were attacking British and Arab personnel 
and buildings. The British military force fought back, while the Govern-
ment was slow in stamping out the resistance for fear of bringing about 
strong American countra-pressures . The British thought that if the 
Americans had to face the hard facts of the case, their policy f or sec-
urity in the Near East through deferring the problem stood a good chance 
of success. 
gation, made it almost impossible to conti nue a Jewish and an Arab 
pol icy on former lines . The inquiry was bound to produce some kind of 
a compromise report which could be counted on to be rejected by either 
J ews or Arabs , or even both. While Truman had stated on different 
occasions the policy of advanced consultation , it appeared that the 
Anglo- American Commission was to be created without full consultation 
with both Jews and Arabs . 
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CHAPTER III 
EFFECT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
On December 10, 1945, President Truman announced the names of the 
six members representing the United States on the Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry. It appeared at first that the Committee was going to have a 
difficult time, because the Zionists viewed the Committee as another 
British stalling tactic and called for immediate immigration of 100,000 
European Jews to Palestine while the Arabs condemned the committee as a 
ridiculous and imperialistic consideration. Congress felt the pressure 
from Zionists for a Jewish National Home while Truman, who was bringing 
the United States into a position of responsibility, had to achieve 
some quick practical results for both Jews and Arabs, or lose the support 
of one or both. 
The chairman of the American representatives was Joseph Chappell 
Hutcheson, Jr., a federal judge from the Fifth Circuit Court of Texas. 
Others were Frank Aydelotte, former president of Swarthmore College, then 
director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and American 
secretary of the Rhodes Trust; Frank W. Buxton, editor of the Boston 
Herald; o. Max Gardner, former Governor of North Carolina and a Washington 
attorney; James Grover McDonald, who had been the League of ations' 
High Commissioner for German Refugees; and William Phillips, former 
Under-Secretary of State , Ambassador to Italy, Presidential representative 
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in New Del hi , India, and delegate to the London Naval Conference in 1935.1 
On December 18, Truman named Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, a San 
Francisco attorney, to succeed O. Max Gardner on the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry. The White House stated that Gardner, then 
chairman of the advisory board of the Office of War Mobilization and 
Reconversion , would not have the required time to spend in the study of 
2 the Palestine problem. 
The six American members of the Anglo- American Committee met in-
formally on December 14, 1945 , at the State Department where they were 
briefed on the problems of Palestine and the serious responsibility they 
1um ted States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 , pp. 9 58-
959; Hereinafter cited as Bulletin; New York Times, December 11, 1945, 
p . l ; Harry s . Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City , N. Y.: 
Doubl eday and Company, Inc ., 1956f:p. 145 . Hereinafter cited as Truman, 
Years of Trial . 
2New York Times , December 19 , 1945 , p . 14; Truman, Years of Trial , 
p . 145. Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curta\!} (New York : Simon and 
Schuster , 1947) , p . 4 , states : 11I had indicated previously that if 
appointed to the committee , I would accept; but when the list of appointees 
was issued in Washington my name was not on it. This was the first sug-
gestion of that strange atmosphere of intrigue which was to make itself 
felt so frequently throughout the course of our investigation over four 
continents and through a dozen countries . The State Department - or at 
l east someone in the State Department - preferred not to have me on the 
committee . From other sources in government I learned that the President 
himself had sent in my name , but that it was rejected three times. Only 
through the insistence of Mr . Truman, who found it necessary to cable 
Mr . Byrnes in Moscow was I finally appointed. " Hereinafter cited as 
Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain. (Letters of appointment were signed by 
the President on January 2, 1946 , but dated with December 10, 1945, except 
Bartley C. Crum which was dated on December 18, 1945. The members had 
earlier been contacted by telephone , but not with a formal letter as con-
f i rmation of thei r appointment . Memorandum by James Byrnes , January 2 , 
1946 , Truman Papers . Harry S. Truman Li brary. Hereinafter all letters , 
t elegr ams , and memorandums are in t he Truman Papers , Harry s. Truman 
Library unless otherwise stated. ) 
had undertaken and an appointment with the President was arranged for 
the following day. In this conference Truman conveyed his "faith and 
hope and belief" in their achieving some rapid and practical results. 
While leaving the White House, Joseph C. Hutcheson stated that "the 
President sympathized with us and hoped for the best. 113 
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The twelve Anglo-American members, under a rotating chairmanship, 
were: 
(1) to examine political, economic, and social conditions in 
Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and 
settlement therein, (2) to examine the position of the Jews in those 
countries in Europe ••• , and the practical measures taken or contem-
plated to be taken ••• to enable them to live free from discrimina-
tion and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish ••• to 
migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe, (3) to hear 
competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on 
the problems of Palestine [as affecting conditions already stated ] 
••• and to make recommendations ••• to His Majesty's Government 
and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of 
these problems as well as for their permanent solution; (4) to make 
such other recommendations ••• as may be necessary to meet the 
immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination ••• 
by remedial action in the European countries in ques tion or by the 
provision of fa4ilities for emigration to settlPment in countries outside Europe. 
The urgency for keeping the Commission from bei ng drawn out led 
both Governments to request that the Committee submit their report within 
one hundred and twenty days after the start of the inquiry. Some members 
3New York Times, December 16, 1945, p. 25. Loy W. Henderson, 
Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to Matthew 
J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, December 11, 1945. 
4united States Senate, Statement of the President of the United 
States together with the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
on Palestine as Submitted to the President and to the Government of the 
United Kingdom, 79th Congress7nd Session, Senate Document 182 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 1. Hereinafter cited as Report 
of the Anglo-American Committee. 
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of the Committee expressed a desire to postpone entering into their 
duties so ~hey could spend Christmas at home. As a result, they assembled 
in Washington and began public hearings on January 7, 1946.5 
Congress rallied to the Zionist cause. On December 12, 1945 , 
Robert Ferdinand Wagner, New York Senator, reported a joint resolution 
from the Committee on Foreign Relations stating: 
That the interest shown by the President in the solution of this 
problem is hereby commended, and that the United States shall use 
its good offices with the mandatory power to the end that Palestine 
shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country to the 
maximum of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and that 
there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development, 
so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine 
as the Jewish national home and, in association with all elements 
of the population, establish Palestine as a democratic common-
wealth in whigh all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have 
equal rights. 
The resolution passed the House on December 17. Truman and the State 
Department had in the past been against aey resolutions which might up-
set the economic and strategic conditions in the Near East. Neither 
Truman nor the State Department asked Congress to lay as ide t he resolu-
tion; but, on November 29, Truman withdrew his support from this resolu-
tion due to the changing conditions in the Palestine problem. Debate in 
the Senate centered around Truman's support of the resolution and the 
resolution was finally passed by the Senate on December 19, 1945. The day 
before its passing, twenty Senators petiti oned Truman to arrange for 
~eport of the Anglo-American Committee, p. l; Loy W. Henderson 
to Matthew J. Connelly, Memorandum December 11, 1945; Truman in Years of 
Trial is in error by stating that "the committee began work with public 
hearings in Washington on January 4, 1945. 0 
6congressional Record, '79th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 11881-2. 
36 
immediate immigration of 100,000 European Jews into Palestine. 7 
On December 28, 1945, President Truman received a telegram from 
Wise and Silver reminding him that Jewish immigration into Palestine 
would be stopped until after the termination of the Inquiry. This was 
to keep the Arabs in favor of the Anglo-American investigation. Wi se 
and Silver recalled that Secretary of State Byrnes on "October 188 had 
indicated that even the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees 
would not change the basic situation in Palestine, and, therefore, should 
not require consultation with Arab leaders. 119 Thus, the Jewish immigra-
tion should take place immediately because the inquiry could not finish 
its report until spring and many would lose their lives during the winter. 
Truman did nothing because the Committee was to function in ten days 
and the British Government was sounding out the Arabs on continuation of 
immigration at the rate designed in the 1939 White aper. The Arabs 
refused, but on January 30, 1946, the British Government announced that 
7New York Times, December 19, 1945, p. 14; Congressional Record, 
79th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 12138-42, 12165-89. 
8rn Byrnes' October 18, 1945, statement on the Attitude of t he 
American Government toward Palestine, he stated: "should any proposals 
emerge which in our opinion would change the basic situation in Palestine, 
it would be the policy of the Government not to reach final conclusions 
without full consultation with Jewish and Arab leaders. This policy 
was stated, for instance, in a letter which President Roosevelt addressed 
to King Saud on April 5, 1945, and the text of which I have been authorized 
to make available. 11 Bulletin, Vol. 13, October 21, 1945, p. 623; New York 
Times, October 19, 1946, pp. 1, 4. 
9stephen Samuel Wise and Abba Hillel Silver, spokesmen of the 
Jewish Agency, to Harry s. Truman, telegram, December 28, 1945; New York 
Times, December 29, 1945, Po 7. 
immigration would be resumed at the rate of 1 , 500 a month, pending the 
decision of the Anglo- ft.merican Committee . 
On January 18, 1946 , Truman, in an executive order drawn by 
Dean Acheson , directed all departments of the Executive Branch of the 
Government to furnish the American Chairman of the Committee , upon his 
request, records and documents relating to the investigation. If 
justified by a formal statement, confidential records would not have 
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to be furnished . This order included personal information or knowledge 
th b . t d . t · lO on e su Jec un er exarrn.na ion. 
The United States was becoming more involved in Near Eastern 
Affairs . Aramco [Arabian-American Oil Company] had obtained concessions 
for a pipeline from the Palestinian Government. The Army now had an air 
base in Saudi Arabia, and the State Department was negotiating the trans-
fer to Egypt of a large Army air base near Cairo in exchange for bi-
lateral air agreements . Also, the Anglo-American petroleum agreement 
was signed in September , 1945 , which expanded the .American oil rights in 
the mandated areas . Along with these activities in the Near East, there 
10Executive Order 9682 , January 18, 1946, 1946 Supplement to 
the Code of Federal Regulations of the United States . Washington: 
Government Printing Office , 1947, pp. 87- 88. Hereinafter cited as 1946 
Sunplement to Code of the Federal Regulations; Bulletin, Vol. 14, 
January 27 , 19~pp. 127- 128; New York Times, January 20 , 1946, p. 33. 
Bartley Crum, through this source, learned that since September 15, 1938, 
each time a promise was made to the American Jews , the State Department 
then sent letters to the Arab States reassuring them that the public 
promises would not change the situation in Palestine . Crum, Behind the 
Silken Curtain, pp . J6- J7 . 
was a fear of Soviet expansion. Reports of the Soviet Union's actions 
toward the Iranian Government and aggressive moves elsewhere convinced 
Truman that the United States should not "play compromise any longer ." 
He was 11 tired of babying the Soviets . 1111 
Truman ' s Army Day address, on April 6, 1947, gave an indication 
of American interest in the Near East. 
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This area contains vast natural resources . It lies across the 
most convenient routes of land, air, and water communication. It 
is ••• an area of great economic and strategic importance, the 
nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively 
to withstand powerful aggression. 
It is easy to see ••• how the Near East •• • might become an 
area of intense rivalry between out1~de powers, and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict . 
The .Anglo-American Committee finished their unanimous report on 
April 20 , and it was presented to President Truman on April 22 by the 
American chairman, Hutcheson. Truman released the report to the public 
with the following policy statement on April 30, 1946, at 7:00 p .m. 13 
I am very happy that the request which I mPie for the immediate 
admission of 100, 000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously en-
dorsed by the Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry. The transference 
of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the 
greatest dispatch . The protection and safeguarding of the holy places 
in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian, and Jew is adequately 
provided in the report. One of the significant features in the 
report is that it aims to insure complete protection to the Arab 
population of Palestine by guaranteeing their civil and religious 
rights, and by recommending measures for the constant improvement 
11Harry s. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
d~y and Company, Inc., 1955), p . 552. Hereinafter cited as Truman, 
Decisions . 
12Text in New York Times, April 7, 1946, P• 29. 
13New York Times, April 26 , 1946, P• 17. 
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in their cultural, educational, and economic position. 
I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the 
abrogation of the white paper of 1939, including existing restric-
tions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further 
development of the Jewish national home. It is also gratifying that 
the report envisages the carrying out of large-scale economic develop-
ment projects in Palestine which facilitate further immigration and 
be of benefit to the entire population. 
In addition to these immediate objectives the report deals with 
maey other questions of long-range political policies and questions 
of international law w£4ch require careful study and which I will 
take under advisement. 
Ten recommendations were made in the report; these, in brief, 
were: (1) Since Palestine alone cannot meet Jewish European immigration 
needs, other homes should be found for displaced persons, and respect for 
their fundamental rights and freedoms should be secured. (2) 100,000 
certificates of immigration into Palestine should be authorized immediately. 
(3) Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state but one which 
guards the rights of Hoslems, Jews and Christians alike. (4) Until 
hostility disappears in Palestine, it should be continued under mandate 
pending a United Nations trusteeship agreement. (5 The British Govern-
ment should bring the Arab standard of living up to that of the Jews. (6) 
Immigration into Palestine should be facilitated while insuring that the 
rights and position of other sections of the population are not pre-
judiced. (7) Freedom in the transfer of land should be restored; 
stipulations that only members of one race or creed should be employed 
on certain properties should be prohibited. (8) Plans for large-scale 
14Report of the Anglo-American Committee, p. iii; Truman to Dean 
Gooderham Acheson, Under-Secretary of State , April 30, 1946; New York 
Times, May 1, 1946, p. l; Bulletin, Vol. 14, May 12, 1946, p. 783. 
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agricultural and industrial development should be conducted not only in 
cooperation with the Jewish Agency, but also with the neighboring Arab 
states. (9) Education of Jews and Arabs should be reformed in the 
interest of conciliation. (10) Violence should be repressed in 
Palestine.15 
A number of questions had been raised in Washington. Firs t, could 
the recommendations of the Committee for 100,000 Jewish immigrants be 
imposed on the Arabs without force7 Second, was the United States 
prepared to assume part of the responsibility for carrying out Truman's 
immigration policy? Third, what effect would Truman' s policy have on 
current economic and military negotiations in the Near and Middle East? 
Fourth, was there some agreement between Truman and Attlee on these 
t . ?16 ques ions, 
King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia had informed Britain and the United 
States on April 19, that if they continued encouraging J ewish immigration 
into Palestine, they risked incurring the enmity of t he Arabs as well as 
all Moslems. With the release of the report the Arabs stated that 11 we 
will grab at aey straw. 1117 This meant Russia or anyone who would help 
them. The Arab office was considering putting the Palestine question 
before the United Nations Security Council in an effort to counteract 
the recommendation for immediate admission of 100,000 European Jews to 
l5Report of the Anglo-American Committee, inclusive. 
16New York Times, May 1, 1946, p. 13. 
17New York Times, May 1, 1946, p. 1. 
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Palestine. On May 6, the President received his formal answer to the 
first question. Mohammed Hassan Kubba, President of Chamber of Deputies 
of Iraq, stated 11we therefore consider impossible implementation of such 
recommendations which will inevitably lead to disturbance of peace and 
tranquillity in the countries of the Middle East . 1118 Other messages came 
from other leaders of Arab countries, each asking that no action take 
place in regard to the implementing of the Anglo-American Report.19 
Truman did not accept the threats of possibly losing the Arab friendship. 
In return correspondence Truman, in each case, stated: "you may rest 
assured therefore that no decision regarding the Committee's report will 
be made without prior consultation with the [Arab] Govt [Sic . ] •••• 20 
On May 16, Truman was called upon by the Arab League to declare publicly 
that he was not bound in any way to carry out the recommendations of the 
Committee. However, Truman stated that he would not go back on the parts 
21 of the report which he had already accepted. 
The reaction of the Jewish Zionists, as would be expected, was 
more favorable than that of the Arabs. They were glad to see the request 
1~oharnmed Hassan Kubba, President of the Chamber of Deputies of 
Iraq, to Truman, Telegram, May 6, 1946. 
19shurki El Kawatli, President of the Syrian Republic , to Truman, 
Telegram, May 16, 1946; Bechara Khalil Elkhoury, President of the Lebanese 
Republic to Truman, Telegram, May 14, 1946; Abdul Ilah, Regent of the 
Kingdom of Iraq, to Truman, Telegram, May 9, 1946. 
20Truman to Abdul Ilah, May 15, 1946; Truman to Bechara Khalil El 
Ehqury, May 22, 1946. 
21New York Times, May 16, 1946, p. lJ; May 4, 1946, P• 5; May 17, 
1946, p. l; May JO, 1946, p. 8. 
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for the 100,000 displaced persons and wanted immediate action. The 
Jewish Agency for Palestine even offered to help in fulfilling this 
point. The executive committee of the American Jewish Committee adopted 
a resolution for the immediate fulfillment of the Anglo-American Com-
mittee's recommendations. The Jews had great hope in Truman for an 
almost immediate Jewish National Home. 22 
To the second question on American joint responsibility in carry-
ing out Truman's policy, the State Department, on May 3, stated that they 
had not been officially informed of any request of the British Govern-
ment to make financial and military contributions for maintenance of 
order in Palestine. The State Department treated the Palestine question 
with caution. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, in a press con-
ference, added little new knowledge except the United States might take 
the question to the United Nations. 23 The third and fourth questions 
remained outside the question for 100,000 Jewish refugees . 
On May 1, Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, stated: 
"His Majesty 's Government wishes to be satisfied that they will not be 
called upon to implement a policy that would involve them single-handed 
in such commitments. 1124 Attlee wanted to know to what extent the United 
22Silver, Wise, Louis Lipsky, Ilahum Goldman, Eliahu Epstein, and 
Meyer W. Weigal , heads of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to Truman, 
May 2, 1946. Released to the press on May 3, 1946; New York Times, May 6, 
1946, p. 7. 
23New York Times, May 4, 1946, p. 5. 
24New York Times, May 8, 1946, P• 9. 
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States was prepared to share in military and financial responsibilities 
because England would not act alone. On May 8, Ernest Bevin, Britain's 
Foreign Secretary, indicated that the Committee's recommendations would 
be promptly put into effect with .American help. 25 
It looked as if nothing but advice was coming from the United 
States. Shortly after the Committee's Report was released, Senator 
Arthur Hendrick Vandenburg of Michigan said that he did not believe Attlee's 
proposal "would be acceptable to the United States . 1126 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff said that the reappearance of American troops in the area would 
bring the risk of a serious disturbance far out of proportion to any 
Palestine difficulty. It would involve American oil interest, and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff believed "no action should be taken that would 
commit the U[nited] S[tates] armed forces or turn the people of the 
Middle East away from the Western powers, since we had vital security 
interest there. 1127 
To assure the Americans of the seriousness of trying to work this 
25New York Times, May 9, 1946, p. 9; May 2, 1946, p. l; Harry 
Sacher, The Establ~nt of a State (New York: British Book Center, 
1952), p:--:S9, states: 11Mr:-Attlee and Mr . Bevin were to say on more 
than one occasion that Mr. Truman had accepted only one recommendation 
and they accepted all ten, they illustrate the never-ending audacity of 
elected persons. Mr. Truman in effect accepted recommendation 2, part 
of 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and took the others under advisement. The British 
Government accepted not one single recommendation," as a result of the 
United States Government's refusal to help implement the report. 
26New York Times, May 3, 1946, p. 2. 
27Truman, Years of Trial, p. 1490 
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proposal, the Governments of Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Syria, sent an Aide-Memiore to the State Department demanding adherence 
to the promise of consultation before any change in the status of Pales-
tine. On May 10, Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson reassured the 
Arabs that the United States had intended to consult both Jews and 
28 Arabs before taking any definite action on the Committee's report. 
However , on May 22, it was announced by the State Department that 
11 there is no conflict and can be no conflict in the two statementso 
[Truman's statement of April JO, and Acheson's of May 10. J It must be 
clear that the President's statements are controlling upon all depart-
ments of government. 1129 Then the State Department sent a message to the 
Arab Govermaents and J ewish organizations describing the American interest 
in the Committee's recommendations. It stated that the United States 
felt that justice demanded the offer of help not only to the Jews, but 
also the Arabs. In addition, the United States had an interest "in 
maintaining and promoting mutually beneficial and h&~-monious relations 
between the United States and the countries of the Near East in the 
political field, in education and other cultural activities, in trade, 
and in economic development. 1130 The message did little to clarify the 
issue. 
28Text in New York Times , May 17, 1946, p. 6; May 11, 1946, P• 10; 
Bulletin, Vol. 16, June 2,1946°, p. 956. 
29Bulletin, Vol. 16, June 2, 1946, p . 956; New York Times, May 23, 
1946, p . 2. 
JOBulletin, Volo 16, June 2, 1946, P• 957. 
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President Truman was not ready to allow t he opening presented by 
the Anglo-American Committee to slip away . He tried to persuade the 
British to take action on the recommendations. After Truman consulted 
Dean Acheson and other advisers , the President sent a message to Attlee 
to invite the Arab governments for consultation. Truman, in his May 8 
l etter, stated: 
I have been considering the next steps which should be taken 
with regard to Palestine and believe that the first thine to be 
done is to initiate t he consultation with Jews and Arabs to which 
both our governments are committed. I believe the report of the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry offers a basis for such con-
sultations and I should welcome your comments . 
The report will be brought by this government in the immediate 
future to the attention of the Jewish and Arab organizations speci -
fied below as well as the government of Arab states with which this 
government maintains relations with the request that they transmit 
their views on it within a certain period, say two weeks . On 
receipt of their views this government will consult the British 
government and then proceed to determine its attitude toward the 
report as a whole and to i ssue a public statement as to the extent 
to which it i s prepared to accept the report as the baRis for its 
Palestine policy. 
I imagine that the British government will wish to take con-
current action and should be glad to know if thi s assumption is 
correct. In view of the urgency surrounding t question of ad-
mission to Palestine of the 100,000 Jews whose entry is recommended 
by the Committee , I sincerely hope that it will be possible to 
initiate and complete the consuljition with Arabs and Jews at the 
earliest possible moment •••• 
Attlee answered almost immediately , but wanted many possible 
dif~iculties smoothed out before any policJ was announced. On Hay 10, 
19Lh, Attlee asked for a postponem8nt until after May 20, and stated 
tr.at t·,m weel-:s were not long enough . He thought some provision should 
31Truman to Clement Richard Attlee , Prime Minister of -Snrrland , 
'.ay P, , 1946; alco in Trurn;rn, Years of Trial , p . 147. 
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be made for the study of "financial and military liabilities which would 
be involved. 1132 In an effort to speed up the study, President Truman, 
on May 16, had a long conference with Dean Acheson on Palestine. Truman 
then sent another letter to Attlee stating that the Jews and Arabs in 
their consultation in the matter would simplify many problems, and that 
Britain and the United States should wait for their replies to see which 
problems were not settled.33 
President Truman had no intention of either modifying his demands 
for 100,000 Jews into Palestine or asking Congress for a modification of 
the immigration laws into the United States. British newspapers claimed 
that the only reason Truman demanded the immigration of 100,000 Jews was 
to keep them out of the United States. Truman, at this time, had a 
group of experts working on the problems of housing, transportation and 
finance. 34 
On May 17, in addition to sending messages for vance consultation 
to the Arabs, Truman sent Attlee a draft of the memorandum to be issued 
on Hay 20. The memorandum stated that the Anglo-American report was 
advisory and not binding and called on all parties involved to as si s t 
32Truman, Years of Trial, p. 147. 
33Truman to Attlee, May 16, 1946; Also Truman, Years of Trial, 
pp. 147-148. 
34New York Times, May 15, 1946, p. 8; June 7, 1946, p. 11; 
Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 148-149. 
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in the formation of a policy within thirty days . 35 
On May 27, Attlee wrote Truman of forty-three subjects which he 
thought the experts of the two nations should take up. Truman considered 
this a stalling tactic because he believed the 100,000 Jews should be 
moved immediately. However, the British Government did not want to take 
up the subject of 100,000 Jews alone. Attlee wanted to discuss all 
points of view. Truman saw no reason why all the arrangements for the 
admission of the Jews could not be made alone. Prime Minister Attlee 
infonned Truman, on June 14, that he had appointed a committee to discuss 
the findings of the Anglo-American Report. 36 
On l1ay 24, Truman received a preliminary message from King Ibn 
Saud giving the Arab's position. 
We should like to assure your Excellency that the Arab and 
Moslem world places great hope in the United States Government as 
the bearer of the torch of freedom and the defender of right and 
justice throughout the world irrespective of race, color or creed. 
We believe that among the principle motives which prompt your 
Government in helping the cause of the Zionists is the motive arising 
from its belief thaj7(by so doing) it is serving the cause of justice, right and humanity. 
The letter stated that the United States should consider Arab humanity as 
well as Jewish. It was not until July J that Dean Acheson prepared a 
reply which was not sent by the President until July 8.38 
35Presidential memorandum to be used in connection with Palestine 
Report, May 17, 1946; Bulletin, Vol. 14, June 2, 1946; pp. 956-957; 
May 26, 1946, p. 917. 
36Truman, Years of Trial, p. 150. 
37Ton Saud to Truman, May 24, 1946. 
38see page 49. 
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At this point Truman started referring all letters for study to 
David Niles, assistant on minority affairs. One such letter was from Wise, 
Silver, Lipsky, and Goldman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. In this 
four page letter conditions were laid down as to how Palestine could 
absorb 100,000 immigrating Jews without seriously affecting conditions 
in Palestine. Financing would be by contributions, partial reparation 
from Germany, assistance from other countries, and public development 
projects by lending countries or private companies. Here was the method 
the Jews hoped to use in settling the 100,000 European Jews in Palestine.39 
On June 11, Truman appointed a special Cabinet Committee on 
Palestine and Related Problems composed of the Secretaries of State, War, 
and Treasury, to "assist the President in the early consideration of the 
d t . f th An 1 Am . C ·tt f I · 1140 recommen a ions o e go- erican onmn. ee o nquiry •••• 
Each Cabinet Secretary was to appoint an alternate to discuss the report. 
Byrnes named Henry Francis Grady, former head of the United States Section 
of Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections , as head of the 
delegation.41 ~bile the British Government was reluctant to discuss 
39wise, Silver, Lipsky, and Goldman to Truman, June 14, 1946. 
On July 2 Truman "expressed his thanks for the workmanlike suggestions 
embodied in the letter which the American members of the Jewish Agency 
Executive sent him on June 14 with respect to the technical and financial 
immigrants." Bulletin, Vol. 15, July 14, 1946, p. 70. 
40Bulletin, Vol. 15, June 23, 1946 , pp. 1089-1090; New York 
Times, June 12, 1946, p. l; Executive Order 9735, June 11, 1946, Supple-
ment to the Code of Federal Regulations, pp. 136-137. 
410fficial confirmation in Truman to Henry Francis Grady, member 
of special Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems, July 9, 
1946. 
parts of the .Anglo-American Report, Secretary of State Byrnes acknow-
ledged that the United States was prepared to discuss what military 
forces, if any, would be made available. 
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On July 8, Truman answered Ibn Saud's letter of May 24 stating 
he was pleased that Ibn Saud understood the humanitarian principles 
involved and the complexity of the Anglo-American Report . Dean Acheson, 
who wrote the letter for Truman, stated: 
I am sincere in my belief that the admission to Palestine of 
100,000 Jewish Refugees this year would neither prejudice the 
rights and privileges of the Arabs now in Palestine , nor constitute 
a change in the basic situation. I am convinced that Palestine 
can absorb 100,000 additional residents through i 42 existing economy without interfering with the present inhabitants. 
Truman received another letter from Wise , Silver, Lipsky , and Goldman, 
which called for immediate admittance of 100,000 Jews before it was 
too late.43 Matthew J. Connelly , Secretary to the President , answered 
the letter that Truman "was prepared to use every possible facility to 
44 hasten the transfer, once negotiations have been cr"'lpleted. 11 
Bevin 's speech to a Labor Party Conference on June 12, hinted to 
what extent the British were perplexed. He told the audience that the 
British could not afford the added expense of transferring and settling 
42Truman to Ibn Saud , July 8 , 1946. It should be noted that the 
State Department did not consider the admission of 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine as a basic change as already stated by Byrnes on October 18, 
1945. 
4\Jise, Silver, Lipsky, and Goldman to Truman, July 8 , 1946. 
44connelly to the Jewish Agency for Palestine , July 18, 1946. 
100,000 refugees in Palestine without American help. He said that "if 
we put 100,000 Jews in Palestine tomorrow, I would have to put another 
division of British troops in there, and I am not prepared to do it. 1145 
In regard to the position of the United States , and particularly New 
York, Bevin stated that the 100,000 Jews were to be put into Palestine 
because the United States did not want them in New York. 
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Political opinion in the United States , however, misunderstood 
the Foreign Minister as falsely questioning American motives. On June 6, 
the Senate criticized the British Government in debate for stalling on 
the refugee problem. There were suggestions that the British loan be 
re-examined and that Britain give up the mandate as an unfit adminis-
46 trator. At this time Zionists were working harder for the reestablish-
ment of the Jewish State in the land of Israel. President Truman asked 
the Immigration Service to expedite admission of displaced persons under 
existing laws as early as 1945 but he did not press Congress for a change 
in the laws to admit more refugees.47 The Zionists opposed aey law for 
more immigration into the United States because it would weaken their 
cause for Palestine. 
The arrest on June 29, 1946, of members of the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine, because of an alleged connection with the growing wave of 
45New York Times, June 13, 1946, p. 4. 
46 Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, former member of the Anglo-.1\merican 
Committee of Inquiry, to Truman, Telegram, July 24, 1946. 
47New York Times, August 18, 1946, P• 7. 
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terrorism, brought about anti-British feeling in the United States and 
when Britain did move against Zionist aims in Palestine , a propaganda 
wave swept through the United States who was forced, by public opinion, 
to bring pressure to bear on the mandatory. The President felt obligated 
to issue a statement denying previous knowledge of the arrests48 and in 
a meeting with Wise, Silver , Lipsky, and Goldman, on July 2, 19~6, Truman 
revealed that the British military operations in Palestine had been 
undertaken without his prior knowledge and expressed hope that they 
would be released.49 
Terrorism continued to increase until, on July 22, the Jerusalem 
King David Hotel, headquarters of the British administration, was 
bombed. The bombing resulted in the death of a large number of British, 
Arabs, and Jews. The pro-Zionists in the United States disapproved of 
this act of destruction and murder. The British gained in propaganda 
material and issued a White Paper linking the Agency and Zionist 
terrorism. With this paper came the comment: "It was no longer possible 
for His Majesty 's Government to adopt a passive attitude. 1150 President 
Truman expressed his regret at the development in Palestine, and told 
the British of his demand for the admission of 100,000 immigrants. He 
also stated that the United States was prepared to assume technical and 
~ulletin, Vol. 1.5, July 7, 1946, p. J9. 
49Bulletin, Vol. 1.5, July 14, 1946, P• 70. 
50Text in New York Times , July 2.5, 1946, p . 8. 
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financial responsibility for the transportation of the immigrants from 
Europe to Palestine. 
The bombing in Palestine, and the pro-Zionist agitation in Great 
Britain and the United States , had provided immediate opportunity for the 
London meetings of Truman's Cabinet Committee and a British committee 
headed by Herbert Morrison . The American Cabinet Committee alternates 
left Washington aboard the presidential plane on July 10, a week earlier 
than originally planned, because of the terrorism.51 A plan was formed, 
different from that of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which 
was called the "Morrison-Grady Plan." It was an almost entirely British 
creation, and on July 24, was submitted to both governments . Instead of 
suggesting means of working the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's 
plan, it was completely rejected. The Morrison- Grady Plan called for 
advocating provincial autonomy leading to bi-national state or even 
partition which left Great Britain in effective control of the area for 
an indefinite period. It also suggested that the United States immediately 
admit 50,000 displaced persons, some of them Jews, while Great Britain 
would retain control of Palestine immigration and would admit the first 
100,000 Jewish refugees only after both Arabs and Jews accepted the Plan. 
With the creation of bi-nationalism, semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish 
provinces would be created, with the Jews having 1,500 square miles. 
Each province was to elect a legislature, which would function under a 
51Truman, Years of Trial, p. 151; Bulletin, Vol . 15, July 21, 
1946, p. 107. 
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high commissioner who controlled foreign affairs , customs, and currency, 
and who had a veto over acts of the provincial legislature. Britain 
would have retained direct control of Jerusalem and the Negev, and also 
control of immigration. The United States would grant $50, 000 , 000 to 
t he Palestine Government for the purpose of financing development schemes 
and our share in an International bank in Palestine. President Truman 
would also recommend legislation for loans to the Arab province of up to 
$250 , 000 , 000 . 52 The Morrison-Grady recommendations were never officially 
published, but were apparently 11 leaked11 to various newsmen. 
The Cabinet Committee had considered the new international develop-
ment. Mr . Grady apparently supported the plan on the grounds that if 
war resulted between the East and West, Palestine would be needed as a 
military base . Truman said together "with the threat of a Communist 
coup in Greece , this [Russian activity in Iran] began to look like a 
giant pincher movement against the oil- rich areas of the ear East and 
the warm water ports of the Mediterranean. 1153 These new developments had 
made Britain skeptical of taking the problem to the United Nations where 
Russia mi ht support and win the Arab states . However, the United Nations 
was not ruled out if the United States refused support. 54 
Byrnes and Attlee discussed Palestine while in Paris to attend 
the Peace Conference, and Byrnes became convinced that the Middle East was 
5~ew York Times, July 26 , 1946, PP• 1 , 4 . 
53Truman, Year of Decisions , p . 52) • 
.54New York Times , August 9, 1946 , p . J . 
vital for defense. Byrnes was probably embarrassed by the President's 
first statement concerning the Committee of Inquiry report and realized 
the need of an Anglo-American policy to block Russian expansion. The 
Secretary of State, therefore, urged President Truman to accept the 
British proposals or he would leave future decisions of Palestine 
entirely to the White House. 55 
While the British were seeking .American support, the next move 
came from President Truman, who on July 31, recalled the Cabinet 
Committee from London "to discuss the whole matter with him in detai1. 1156 
His political advisers told him to consider the political repercussions 
of the plano Byrnes recommended acceptance as a basis for negotiations 
since retreat would force the British to submit the question to the 
United Nations . Here the United States as well as Russia could take a 
. leading part in working out a settlement. 
The Zionists at this time abandoned the stipulations of the 
Biltmore Program, which demanded all of Palestine as a Jewish state, 
and said that they would accept a partition plan that would give them 
two-thirds of Palestine as an independent state . This change resulted 
from the opposition created by Zionists terrorists after the bombing of 
the King David Hotel . The Jews now felt they had little chance of big-
power support for a complete independent state. The Arabs, meanwhile, 
threatened the West with the possibility of the Arab states turning to 
55New York Times, July JO, 1946, PP• 1, 4. 
56Bulletin, Vol. 15, August 11, 1946, P• 266. 
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Russia. 
The British strengthened their pressures against illegal immi-
gration while urging for an early decision. On August 11, Haifa Harbor 
was sealed off from illegal immigration, and the refugees were sent to 
Cyprus while waiting to be admitted into alestine. 
The President considered accepting the Grady-Morrison Plan. On 
August 10 it was reported that Under-Secretary Acheson had sometime 
earlier instructed the Cabinet Committee alternates to draft a cablegram 
accepting federation in principle, but suggested more area for the 
Jewish province, more liberal immigration provisions, and relaxation of 
the l and acquisition rules. Truman recalled and consulted the original 
Anglo-American Committee's American members , who pointed out that the 
Morrison-Grady Plan was almost identical with one submitted to the 
committee and rejected in its entirety a year earlier. 57 As a result, 
Truman did not endorse the scheme. 58 Thus, with the exchanging of views 
with the British Government, it should be noted tr t the United States 
had never "presented any- plan of its own for the solution of the problem 
of Palestine . 1159 The President had tried to find a fair solution for all 
parties involved, especially the displaced Jews in Europe , but it was 
the hope of the United States Government to bring peace and prosperity 
57Bulletin, Vol. 15, August 18, 1946, p. JJ4; J.C. Hurewitz , 
The Struggle for Palestine (New York: H. w. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950), 
pp. 258-259. 
58New York Times, August 6, 1946, pp. 1, 6; August 8, 1946, p. 11. 
59Bulletin, Vol. 15, August 25, 1946, p. J80. 
to Palestine in a spirit of conciliation. After many months the Jews 
received more and better promises but with each promise, the Arabs were 
assured that nothing would be done without advance consultation. The 
United States moved more and more into the sphere of a duel mandatory 
with Britain. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had superceded 
the White Paper of 1939 on continuation of immigration and land transfer. 
Since Britain and the United States could not agree on the report, 
another committee started to work . Truman had not compromised his pre-
Anglo-American Committee position, but had pulled the British off their 
solid foundation of the 1939 White Paper. The Arabs had turned to Britain 
as a brake on the Truman Administration. With this, Truman was able 
to move even further into the Zionist position with a lesser degree of 
fear of Soviet intervention. Though the Cabinet Committee had accomp-
lished little or nothing, it had kept the hopes alive for the Jewso 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ASSUMPTION OF PALESTINE RESPONSIBILITY 
IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
If the Arabs, Jews, and British could find an agreement, the 
United States had taken the position that it would promise financial and 
technical assistance. This was brought about by a new partition scheme 
proposed by the Jewish Agency Executive and given to President Truman. 
The President sent the proposal to London for consideration. The British 
Government invited the Arabs and Jews to London to discuss a settlement 
based on the Grady-Morrison Plan. The Jewish Agency's plan would give 
the Jews more land, control of their own immigration, and the United States 
would give financial and technical help until the Jewish area was well 
founded. This proposal was more Zionist than the Grady-Morrison plan.1 
The British were disappointed in American interfer ence, but were 
willing to discuss the Agency's proposal. Truman stated that the United 
States refused to participate in the proposed discussions. He said he 
was attempting to bring European refugees to settle in the United States. 
The British and Arab Governments saw this as a relaxing of tensions f or 
the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. The American Congress and 
Zionist organizations renounced it because it might weaken the cause of 
a Jewish Palestine. The Jewish Agency refused to take part in the London 
1New York Times, August 13, 1946, p. l; August 14, 1946, P• l; 
August 15, 1946, p. 1. 
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Conference unless the British Government pledged support for a visable 
Jewish State in Palestine with adequate control of its own economic and 
immigration affairs. Bevin was not prepared to promise it , but did not 
rule out its possibility. Therefore, when the London Conference opened 
on September 10, the Arabs were the only ones in attendance. The United 
States Government backed the Jewish Agency's partition plan and the Jews 
would accept nothing less than a visible Jewish ' tate while the Arabs 
completely rejected this plan on the basis that they wanted nothing less 
than the termination of the British mandate and the creation of an in-
dependent Arab state. The London Conference adjourned on October 2, 1946, 
to convene again on December 16. At the same time talks were going on 
with the Arabs , Bevin continued private talks with the Jewish Agency in 
2 an attempt to find a common ground to make the conference a success. 
Bevin, believing that at last he had the right solution, suggested 
an interim program that would eventually lead to full independence . 
Bevin returned to the Paris Conference. Prime ~Iini~ter Attlee was in-
formed that Truman was going to issue another statement on the admission 
of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and that if Truman did not issue a statement , 
one would be issued by Dewey. Bevin stated that he could not settle the 
Palestine question if it were made the object of local elections.3 
2New York Times, August 16, 1946, p. l; August 17, 1946, p . J; 
August 18, 1946, p. 7; September 6 , 1946, P• 5. 
JAlfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel? (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1953), p. 44. Byrnes denied asking Truman to withhold statement 
in New York Times, October 7, 1946, p. 4. James Vincent Forrestal, The 
Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Mills (New York: The Viking Press, 
1951), pp. J46-J47. Hereinafter cited as Forrestal Diaries. 
The Zionis t pos i tion i n the United States was strengthened by 
t he corning American elections in November . Criticism of Truman's 
Administration's 11 do nothing policy" on Palestine , and the displaced 
persons, had greatly weakened the Democratic chances in the state of 
New York where a large percentage of the American Jews lived. Truman's 
statement was in favor of immediate action after the London Conference 
had adjourned and in hope of gaining the Jewish vote . Another reason 
was that it was believed it would help James Michael Mead and Herbert 
H. Lehman, the Democratic candidates for Governor and Senator in New 
York . 
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Truman did not think that the immediate immigration of a large 
number of Jews into Palestine could await a definite solution of the 
entire falestine problem. Thus , President Truman, in a public statement 
on October 4 , 1946 , gave a short historical sketch of his Administra-
tion's efforts to persuade the British to adrnit the 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine . The White House further expressed the belief that a solution 
of the Palestine problem could be along the lines of the Jewish .• gency 
Executive's partition plan. Truman concluded his views as follows: 
(1) In view of the fact that winter will come on before the 
LLondon] Conference can be resumed I believe and urge that substan-
tial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the 
Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations 
for this movement have already been made by this Goverrunent and it 
is ready to lend its immediate assistance . 
(2) I state again , as I have on previous occasions , that the 
immigration laws of other countries , including the United States, 
should be liberalized with a view to the admission of displaced 
persons . I am prepared to make such a recommendation to the 
Congress and to continue as energetically as possible collabora-
tion with other countries on the whole problem of displaced per-
sons . 
(3) Furthermore , should a workable solution for Palestine be 
devised , I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan 
for econamic assistance for the development of that [Palestine] 
country. 
After this Truman officially rejected the Grady-Morrison Plan. Truman 
did not state all of the facts , for he omitted altogether the Arab 
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side. The British and Arab Governments were disappointed with the 
statement, but the Zionists had once again gained an active American 
support and spoke bolder in their demands with Bevin. Wise and Silver 
were glad that Truman issued the statement in favor of the Agency's 
partition plan. In London , the Zionists demanded that more land be given 
them in the partition scheme . 5 
The two rival party leaders , Harry S. Truman and Thomas Edmund 
Dewey, tried to out- do each other for the Jewish vote . On October 6, 
Governor Dewey of New York , at a United Jewish Appeal dinner in the 
Hotel Commodore , outbid Truman by declaring that the British Govern-
ment should not admit 100 , 000 , but "several hundredc- of thousands" 
of Jews into Palestine. 6 Senator Robert Alphonso Taft of Ohio even 
tried to raise the number over that of Dewey. 
Churchill, while speaking at Blackpool on October 5 at the Con-
4United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, October 13, 
1946, p . 670 . Hereinafter cited as Bulletin. New York Times , October 5, 
1946, p . 2. 
5Bulletin, Vol . 15, October 13 , 1946, p . 670; New York Times , 
October 5 , 1946 , pp . 1 , 2; October 10 , 1946 , p . 9 ; October 8 , 1946 , 
p. 2 . 
6New York Times , October 7, 1946, PP • 1 , 5. 
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servative Party's annual conference , stated that the extreme pro-
Zionist position of the Labor Party had left the British Government 
without any definite plan or policy. In addition, he stated that 
the Labor Party had no interest in holding the Mandate and were gaining 
t he hostility and distrust of Jews and Arabs . Truman reminded Attlee 
that fifteen months had passed since the Harrison Report and that 
immediate action should be taken. 7 
For the Arabs, anger reached a high point. They claimed that 
the United States could easily absorb the Jewish refugees . King Ton 
Saud of Saudi Arabia wrote a letter to President Truman expressing 
his astonishment at Truman's "demand that floodgates of immigration 
be opened in such a way as to alter the basic situation in Palestine 
in contradiction to previous promises . 118 Ibn Saud was "even greater" 
astonished because Truman had previously stated that hope that the 
London Conference would solve the Palestine problem and that "the 
United States had not made any proposals for the solucion of the 
Palestine problem. 119 Ibn Saud believed that Truman's -statement "con-
tradicts previous promises made by the Government of the United States 
7J . c. Hurewitz , The Struggle for Palestine (New York ; W. W. 
Norton and Co . , Inc . , 1950) , p . 2 6; New York Times, October 12, 1946, 
p . 6. 
~ulletin, Vol . 15, November 10 , 1946 , p . 848. 
9Bulletin, Vol . 15, November 10, 1946 , P• 848 . 
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and statements made .from the White House . 1110 
Zionists called Ibn Saud ' s nation very backward and claim,d that 
i.f the Jews controlled the area it woul b prosperous. On Octob r 2, 
Truman answered Ibn Saud by sketching the situation o.f the J ws i_n 
Europe and the American promises to support a Jpwish National Hom in 
Palestine. Truman then pointed out his desire for imm diate entry into 
Palestine of 100,000 Jews. He was prepared to ask Congress for sp clal 
legislation to admit "additional numbers of these persons, ov rand above 
the immigration quotas fixed by our laws 11 into the United Stcttes. 11 
Truman did not think his statement of October 4 would affect th basic 
situation in Palestine . There.fore, prior consultation with both J ws 
and Arabs was not needed. Truman gave his assurance that the United 
States would take no action which might prove hostile to the ab people . 
The President did not consider large-scale immigration as an act hostile 
to the Arab people or affecting th basic situation. He - lso r minded 
Ibn Saud of the number of consultations which had alr ady be n held with 
both Arabs and Jews. Stephen S. Wise backed Mead and Lehman in New 
York and was pleased with Truman's reply to the Ibn Saud lett r. N w 
10Bulletin, Vol. 15, November 10, 1946, p. 848; Text in New fork 
Times, October 18, 1946, p . l; October 15, 1946, p. 14; It wa5 pointed 
out that English translation leaves certain omissions and discr pancjes , 
such as Arabs fought with Allies in last war and a suspicion of motiv s 
of the United St;ttes Government. New York Times, November 26, 1946, p. 28. 
The Arab Office in London corrected the misunderstanding as a difficulty 
in translation, and said the United 3tates State Department had both the 
original and the English translation. New York Tims, December 6 , 1946, 
p. 6. 
11nulletin, Vol . 15, November 10 , 1946, P· 849. 
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York Zionists would not back Wise's statement, but would vote for the 
party which would guarantee them the greatest support for Palestine . 
Goldman of the Jewish Appeal for Palestine praised Truman on his stand 
to the Ton Saud letter.12 
On October 18, the British Government refused to grant any in-
crease in the Jewish immigration quota into Palestine . On October 22, 
Byrnes tried to avoid the Zionist issue but complained that the State 
Department's sole authority in regard to the Palestine problem was merely 
to transmit messages for and from the President. The following day , 
Stephen S. Wise wrote Byrnes praising the President's statement of October 4, 
and inquired on a rumor "to the effect that the President's statement is not 
to be considered as policy of the American Government. 1113 On October 24, 
Byrnes replied that "I am happy to assure you that the rumors to which 
you refer have no basis in fact. The statement made by the President on 
October 4, with regard to Palestine and to Jewish immigration into Pales-
tine is, of course, an expression of the policy of tnis Government. 1114 
12Eulletin, Vol. 15, November 10, 1946, pp. 848- 850; New York 
Times, October 25, 1946, p. J; October 30, 1946, p . 20; October 31 , 1946, 
p. 15; November 1, 1946, p. 17. Frank E. Manuel in The Realities of 
American-Palestine Relations (Hashington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1949), p. 328 stated: "the most striking aspect of this letter was the 
introduction of a new element of diplomatic policy: for the first time 
an American president formally assumed a 'certain responsibility' in the 
disposition of Palestine. The letter became the first diplomatic docu-
ment to a foreign power in which the United States ••• stated its 
historic obligations towards the Jewish Homeland." 
13Bulletin, Vol. 15, November J, 1946, p. 822. 
14Bulletin, Vol. 15, November J, 1946, p. 822 . 
On October 25, Wise's and Byrnes' letters were released to the public 
and the State Department gave full support to the President's policy.15 
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During the month of November the Jews expanded efforts for a Jewish 
State and asked Truman to support it. On November 4, Byrnes announced 
that Bevin and Truman were to talk about possibly finding a workable 
settlement on Truman's October 4 statement. Before the meeting took place 
on December 8, Truman urged the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine and immigration into the United States . Truman and Bevin agreed 
on many issues. Truman supported the Jewish Agency's Plan which the 
British and Arab Governments still opposed. In an attempt to bring the 
Jews and British together, Secretary of State Byrnes tried to patch up 
difficulties by supporting the London Conference which was to convene on 
December 16. Byrnes wrote a letter to Bevin stating that he thought the 
Jews would attend the conference if they were assured that their partition 
proposal "would be fully considered by His Majesty's Gover ent. 1116 With 
this promise, Byrnes urged all parties to attend, including the presence 
of an American observer. On December 7, the Arab Office in London de-
clared that the Arabs would refuse to attend any more Palestine conferences 
dealing with partition of the Holy Land. The Arabs called for an in-
dependent Palestine with minority rights for the people of Palestine . 17 
15New York Times, October 26, 1946, P• 7• 
16Bulletin, Vol. 15, December 15, 1946, P• 1105. 
17New York Times, November 5, 1946, p. l; November 9, 1946, P• 16; 
November 14, 1946,p.22; December 9, 1946, P• 7• 
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On December 13, Truman talked twenty-five minutes to Ibn Saud's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who later said he felt that Truman would 
treat the problem fairly. King Ton Saud, at a banquet on January 21, 
1947, told some American officials that "President Roosevelt was the 
greatest man I ever met and m;y- best friend; he understood us. 1118 Ibn 
Saud stated that Truman was poorly advised, but a fine man. 19 
During January and February, 1947, the Palestine problem had two 
developments. The increase of Jewish terrorism in Palestine caused the 
British to take drastic measures to restore order. The other was the 
London Conference with Britain's parallel talks between the Arabs and 
Jews. Because neither Jews nor abs would attend the conference in 
December, the conference was postponed. On January 5, 1947, the Arab 
League announced its members would attend the London Conference. Thus , 
when the conference opened on January 27 , all the Arab states were in 
attendance, but the Jews were not. Both Arabs and Jews rejected a 
partition plan for independent ab and Jewish stats . Therefore , on 
February 14, 1947, the conference ended without having reached a 
1 t . 20 sou ion. 
In a news conference on February 1, 1947, Truman's attention was 
called to Churchill's speech in the House of Commons. Churchill urged 
18New York Times, January 24, 1947, p. 12. 
l9New York Times , December 14, 1946, p . 5. 
20New York Times , January 6, 1947, p. 4; February 9 , 1947, P• l; 
February 11, 1947,~2; February 12, 1947, p . 16. 
66 
the British Government to turn Palestine over to the United Nations if 
the United States Government re.fused to share fifty-fifty responsibility. 
Truman stated that Churchill was entitled to his own opinions, but 
refused to make a comment on them. On February 14, with the close of 
the London Conference, Bevin formally announced the placement of the 
Palestine problem before the United Nations. On February 18, Bevin 
announced to the House of Commons that Britain would refer t he Palestine 
problem to the United Nations without any recommendations. 21 
Between the January and October sessions o the General Assembly 
in 1946, the Economic and Social Council made a study of the problem and 
recommended the establishment of an International Refugee Organization 
to provide an effective solution. In December, at the meeting of the 
General Assembly, the draft constitution recommended by the Economic 
and Social Council was adopted. On February 24, 1947, President Truman 
urged Congress to authorize the United States to participate in the 
International Refugee Organization. Truman hoped by vhis means to help 
the European refugees, and seventy-five million dollars was given by the 
President for our participation in the matter. 22 
On February 25, Bevin, in the House of Commons, blamed President 
Truman for the failure to secure an arrangement between the Arabs and 
the Jews. Bevin stated more might have been done to increase t he rate 
21New York Times, Februa!"J 2, 1947, p. J; February 15, 1947, 
p. l; February 19, 1947, p. 1. 
22New York Times, February 25, 1947, PP• 1, 17. 
of immigrat ion, if it had not been for .American pressure for the ad-
mission of 100 , 000 . The speech accused the President of allowing the 
i ssues of the New York elections to govern foreign policy in Palestine. 23 
The .American Jews and Congress praised Truman and condemned Bevin and 
hi s statement as very misleading . 24 On the evening of February 26, a 
statement was released by Charles G. Ross, Presidential press secretary, 
publicly rebuking Foreign Secretary Bevin. 
The impression that has arisen from the debate in the British 
Parliament on February 25 that .America's interest in Palestine 
and the settlement of Jews there is motivated by partisan and 
local politics is most unfortunate and misleading • • • • 
.America's interest in Palestine is of long and continued 
standing . It is a deep and abiding interes25shared by our people with regard to their political affiliation. 
The British position in the Middle East was becoming unstable 
because of official .American pressure and the growing terrorist activi-
ties in Palestine. On February 27, Great Britain informed Washington 
that she could no longer finance anti-Communist forces in Greece . The 
answer to this problem came on March 12, 1947, when resident Truman 
23Forrestal Diaries , pp. 346-347 at a luncheon with James Byrnes 
on December 3 , 1947, showed that Bevin was probably right . "Byrnes 
r ecalled the fact that he had disassociated himself from his decision 
of a year ago to turn down the Grady report which recommended a federated 
state for Palestine or a single Arabian state. He said the decision 
on the part of the President to reject this recommendation and to 
criticize the British for their conduct of Palestinian affairs had placed 
Niles [David K. Niles , administrative assistant to the President] and 
Sam Rosenman were chiefly responsible for the President's decision; 
that both had tol d the President that Dewey was about to come out with a 
s t atement favoring the Zionist position on Palestine , and that they had 
insisted that unless the President anticipated this movement New York 
State would be lost to the Democrats . " 
24New York Times , February 26 , 1947, P• l ; February 27 , 1947, P• 1 . 
25Bulletin, Vol . 16 , March 9 , 1947, P• 449 . 
spoke to Congress . This speech, later known as the Truman doctrine, 
was to protect the stability of Turkey and Greece from Communism. If 
either of the pincher movements of Communists in Iran, or Turkey and 
Greece had been successful, it would have threatened the involvement 
of the whole Near East . 
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Therefore, Palestine had become a significant factor in a policy 
of containment. The United Nations involvement in the Palestine question 
permitted Russian influence in a final settlement, and the Soviets were 
expected to take an even greater interest in Arab affairs. The Near 
East was no longer strictly a British problem. The course American 
diplomacy was to follow in changed circumstances was far from apparent 
in early 1947, but the American Government was in a position of equality 
with Britain. 
CHAPTER V 
PALESTINE PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
On April 2, 1947, Alexander Codogan, permanent representative of 
Britain in the United Nations, wrote a letter to Victor Chi Tsai Hoo, 
Actin Secretary- General , requesting a special session of the General 
Assembly to discuss Palestine. The letter stated that Britain would 
"submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League 
of Nations mandate" and would ask "the Assembly to make recommendations, 
••• concerning the future government of Palestine111 and urged an 
immediate special session to obtain an early settlement in Palestine. 
On April 13, a majority of the members concurred to the request of 
Great Britain, and the Secretary-General called a special session of 
the General Assembly to meet in New York on April 28, 1947. 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria , Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, requested the 
Secretary-General to add "the termination of the mandate over Palestine 
and the declaration of its independence112 to the agenda of the special 
session. However, the General Committee of the Assembly recommended 
1Alexander Codogan, permanent representative of Britain in the 
United Nations , to Victor Chi Tsai Hoo , Acting Secretary-General of 
the United Nations , April 2, 1947, United Nations . General Assembly. 
Special Committee on Palestine . Report to the [second session of the] 
General Assembly (Lake Success , 1947), II, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as 
Report of the Special Committee. 
2r1ahmoud Hassan, Egyptian .Ambassador, to Trygve Lie, Secretary-
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to the First (Political and Security) Committee the exclusion of the 
Arab item which was adopted by the General Assembly on April JO, 1947.3 
As a result, the sole item of Great Britain on the agenda of the special 
session was "constituting and instructing a special committee to pre-
pare for the consideration of the question of Palestine at the second 
regular session."4 A hearing was to be granted to the Jewish Agency 
for Palestine and other organizations for expressing their views on 
the Palestine problem. After discussion, the First Committee decided 
to grant a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee, but refused to hear 
other organizations, because they did not represent a large element of 
the population of Palestine. They also recommended to the General Assembly 
the composition and terms of reference of the Special Committee on 
Palestine, which was adopted on ¥.1ay 15, 1947.5 
General of the United Nations , April 21, 1947; Ali Jawdat, Ambassador 
of Iraq , to Trygve Lie, April 21, 1947; Costi K. Zurayk , Minister of 
Syria to Trygve Lie, April 22, 1947; Charles Malik , .,1inister of Lebanon 
in the United States , to Trygve Lie, April 22, 1947; Asad Al- Faqih, 
Minister of the Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia, to Trygve Lie, April 
22, 1947; in Report of the Special Committee, II, pp . 1-2. 
)This view was held by the United States , and expressed by 
Herschel V. Johnson, Alternate United States Representative, on April 29 
at a meeting of the General Committee. United Nations. General 
Assembly. [First special session of the] General Committee (Lake 
Success, 1947), pp. 17-22. 
4United Nations. General Assembly. Resolutions Adopted gy the 
[first special session of thel General Assembly (Lake Success, 1947), 
p. 5. Hereinafter cited as Resolutions Adopted gy the First Special 
Session. 
5united Nations . General Assembly. Plenary Meetings of the 
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The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was 
to "have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investi-
gate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine; 116 
and UNSCOP was to send a report to the Secretary General not later than 
September 1, 1947. The General Assembly called upon 
all Governments and peoples, and particularly upon the in-
habitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General 
Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from 
the threat or use of force or aey other action which might create 
an atmosphere,trejudicial to an early settlement of the question 
of Palestine. 
On June 5, 1947, Truman issued a statement that citizens of the 
United States should refrain from activities, thre~ts, and use of force 
which might be hazardous to the settlement of the Palestine problem by the 
United N~tions. Truman's statement was general and did not name aey 
organizations or people engaged in undermining law and order in Pales-
tine. Many letters and petitions were sent to President Truman urging him 
to work for free immigration and a democratic commonwealth in Palestine.8 
[first special session of the] General Assembiy (Lake Success, 1947), 
p. 177. Hereinafter cited as Plenary Meetings of the First Special 
Session. The report of the First Committee on a Special Committee on 
Palestine is on PP• 197-203. 
6Resolutions Adopted £l the First Special Session, PP• 6-7; United 
States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, May 25, 1947, PP• 1024-1025. 
Hereinafter cited as Bulletin. 
7Resolutions Adopted !2iZ the First Special Session, P• 7; Bulletin, 
Vol. 16, June 8, 1947, p. 1110; William I. Cargo, "The Creation of the 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine," Bulletin, Vol. 17, July 
6, 1947, pp. 3-lJ. 
8Bulletin, Vol. 16, June 15, 1947, p. 1154; New York Times, May 4, 
1947, p. 4J; May 5, 1947, p. 4; June 6, 1947, PP• 1, 5. 
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The Amer ican Zionist Emergency Council , in reply to Truman ' s 
announcement , stated that it would be helpful if the President spoke to 
Gr eat Britain about their actions in Palestine . Britain was attempting 
to restore law and order but the Jewish underground organizations were 
carryin on guerrilla war fare . They were helping illegal Jewish immigra-
tion into Palestine and breaking down the British Governmental organiza-
tion. On June 16 , President Truman informed eight hundred delegates at 
the Independent Order Brith Abraham convention that the President was 
determined to find a just Palestinian solution. Then he expressed his 
r egret for the displaced persons of Europe as the innocent bystanders 
of the European War . 9 
On July 18, Gr eat Britain seized the ship Exodus~ off the 
coast of Palestine . Protests by Zionists in the United States were 
hurled at the British Government for sending the four thousand un-
authorized Jewish immigrants back to the port i n France from which they 
sailed. The American Jewish Conference and the Ame. ~can Zionist Emergency 
Council sent telegrams to Truman and George Catlett :iarshall , Secretary of 
State, asking for an official protest to Britain. Similar requests came 
f r om the National Council of Jewish Women and Stephen S. Wise , President 
of the World Jewish Congress . They urged Truman to take action for f ree 
immigration and the stoppage of violence , so that the Jewish national 
9New York Times , June 7 , 1947, p . 4 ; June 9 , 1947, p . 11 ; June 16 , 
1947 , p . 10. 
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homeland could be secured for peaceful development. In a cabinet meeting 
on August 8 , Truman "proposed to make no announcements or statements 
upon the Palestine situation until after United Nations had made its 
f . di 1110 0 A t 23 T ill ngs . n ugus , rurnan received an appeal from Jewish refugees 
bei ng sent back to France to intervene with the British Government to 
prevent their return to Germany. The President referred the matter to 
the State Department and there was no indication of any action the 
United States Government would take . 11 The UNSCOP submitted its report 
to the General Assembly with three major recommendations . First , the 
mandate for Palestine was to be ended and independence granted at the 
earliest possible date . These two actions were to be divided by a short 
transitional period under United Nations responsibility . The United 
ations was to undertake the problem of the displaced Buropean Jews 
while protecting the human rights of the people in Palestine . The United 
Nations was to bring about peaceful relations and appeal against the 
acts of violence . Second, a plan of partition (Majc ~·i ty Plan) with an 
economic union was proposed after a two year transitional period. The 
boundries were defined and Jerusalem was to be placed under an Inter-
national Trusteeship System. Third , a plan for a federal - state (Minority) 
10James Forrestal , The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by ,alter lills 
(New York : The Viking PresS:-1951), p . )04. Hereinafter cited as 
Forrestal Diaries . 
11New York Times , July 23 , 1947, p . 8; July 27 , 1947, P• 6; 
August 2 , 1947, p .6;August 22 , 1947, p . 4; August 23 , 1947, P• 6; 
August 24, 1947 , p . 33 . 
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Plan) was proposed after a transitional period. The federal state of 
Palestine was to be composed of an Arab state and a Jewish state.12 
1arshall, in a speech to the United Nations on September 17, 
commended the Special Committee for its contribution on the adoption of 
many basic recommendations. On September 23, the General Assembly 
established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (Ad Hoc 
Committee) to which the General Committee referred the question of 
Palestine, the report of the UNSCOP, and the termination of the mandate 
and recognition of independence. The Ad Hoc Committee met on September 25 
and considered the items presented.13 
James Vincent Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, raised the question 
of possibly lifting the Jewish-Palestine question out of politics. Truman 
said it was worth a try but was skeptical as to the outcome. A week later, 
on October 10, Robert E. Hannegan, Postmaster General, stated that many 
people were pressing the United States Government for s port of the 
Jewish position in Palestine. 
The President said that if they would keep quiet he thought 
that everything would be all right, but that if they persisted in 
the endeavor to go beyond the report of the United Nations Commi1ijion there was grave danger of wrecking all prospects for settlement. 
1~eport of the Special Committee, pp. 42-64; Bulletin, Vol. 17, 
September 21, 1947, pp. 546-561. 
13united Nations. General Assembly. Plenary Meetings of the [second 
session of the] General Assembly (Lake Success, 1947), I, PP• 272-275. 
Hereinafter cited as Plenary Meetings of the Second Session of the General 
Assembly. 
14Forrestal Diaries, P• 323. 
75 
Frank Goldman , International President of B'nai B' rith , Rabbi 
Samuel Thurman of the United Hebrew Congregation in St. Louis an old 
acquaint ance of Truman, and Dean Alfange , chairman of the .American 
Chr istian Pal estine Committee of New York , urged President Truman to 
suppor t the partition of Palestine as recommended in the majority report 
of t he UNSCOP . Rabbi Thurman stated after visiting the President that 
Tr uman was 11 sanguine 11 of success for the Palestine partition plan. The 
New York City Council adopted a resolution f or Truman to instruct the 
United States delegates at the United Nations to support the majority 
r eport. On October 26 , a telegram signed by twenty- three governors 
requested American support for a partition program, and urged Truman to 
use the office of the Presidency to accomplish that end. 15 
On October 11 , Herschel V. Johnson , United States Deputy Represen-
tative to the Uni ted Nations , stated before the Ad Hoc Committee , that 
the United St ates supported the basic principles and the majority plan 
which provided for partition. However , he recommendEl certain amend-
ments and modifications which would not affect the basic principles . In 
addition , he stated the United States was willing to participate in a 
program to assist all parties involved in the establishment of a workable 
political settlerrent in Palestine . Any workable solution would provide 
l 5Jarnes Elisha Folson, Governor of Alabama , and others to Harry 
s . Truman, Pr esident of the United States , Telegram , October 6, 1947, 
Truman Papers . Harry S. Truman Library. Hereinafter all l etters, tele-
gr ams , and memorandums are in the Truman Papers , Harry S. Truman Library 
unless otherwise stated. New York Times , October 6, 1947, P• 4 ; October 
7, 1947 , p. 13; Oct ober 9 , 1947, p.~October 10 , 1947, P• 52 : October 
25' 1947 ' p . 7 0 
for an early assumption of responsibility by the people of their own 
domestic order.16 The following day Henry }1organthau Jr., former Sec-
retary of the Treasury, commenting on Johnson's statement, stated that 
the Jews of America 11 owe a great debt of gratitude to President Truman11 
in supporting the majority report and the "realization and fulfillment 
of the aspirations of the Jewish people for statehood and national 
rebirth. 1117 
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On September 6 , the Arabs were still hoping that President Truman 
would allow a full and complete Arab state in Palestine with guaranteed 
18 freedom and equality for all peoples . On November 20, Norman Armour , 
Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs before the Arab American 
Institute in New York City , stated: 
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the position with the 
Government of the United States has taken with regard to Pales-
tine does not indicate lack of friendship or consideration for the 
Arab world. That position was taken after careful consideration 
of all sides of the question, with particular reference to the 
report and re1§mmendations of the United Nationc Special Committee on Palestine . -
Therefore, on November 29, the Arab's hopes were shattered when 
the General Assembly adopted the resolution recommending a plan of 
16united Nations . General Assembly. Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Palestine Question. Report (Lake Success , 1947)~p. 62-64. 
17New York Times, October 13, 1947, P• 11. 
1~ Iustafa Alumary, Vice President of the Iraqi Senate, to Harry 
s. Truman, Telegram, September 6 , 1947. 
19Bulletin, Vol. 17, November JO, 1947, P• lOJO. 
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partition with economic union. Soviet Russia and the United States 
Government, being supported by public opinion backed the plan. Now , 
Great Britain was to withdraw her armed forces by October 1, 1948. The 
administration of Palestine was to be turned over to a commission of 
five members to act as a mandatory force when Britain moved out. The 
resolution included the provision for an economic union of all Pales-
tine and the protection of religious and minority rights and places . 
The partition plan called for the creation of an international City of 
Jerusalem to be administered by the Trusteeship Council for the United 
N t . 20 a ions. The General Assembly referred the Ad Hoc Committee's report 
to the United Nations Palestine Commission, which was charged with the 
task of implementing the resolution. The first meeting convened at Lake 
Success on January 9. 1948. 
On December 5, 1947, in view of disorder in Palestine, the United 
States Government stopped all arms and ammunition being sent to the Near 
East . This affected for the most part Lebanon, Sauui Arabia , and Egypt. 
The Jews started shipping arms and ammunition into Palestine illegally and 
20united Nations . General Assembly. Resolutions [of the second 
session] (Lake Success , 1947), pp. 131-151; Plenary Meetings of the 
Second Session of the General Assembly, II, pp. 1424-14250 In an article 
"Behind the Scenes of the United Nations Decision," The National Jewish 
Monthly, January, 1948, p. 163, "President Truman took a personal hand 
in the matter. He directly saw to it that the American delegation at 
Flushing Meadow used its influence to obtain the necessary two-thirds 
vote, ••• it was our own American President who , more than any other 
individual, was responsible for the two-thirds U[nited] N[ations] vote 
without which there would have been no Jewish commonwealth this year, 
or for many years to come." Same ideas in Alfred M. Lilienthal, What 
Price Israel? (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), PP• 76-79; Herein-
after cited as Lilienthal, What Price Israel? and Freda Kirchwey , editor 
of The Nation magazine, to Harry s. Truman, January 27, 1948. 
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many were arrested in the United States . On December 11, the British 
Government announced they would terminate their mandate on May 15, 1948, 
and complete evacuation of British troops by August 1 . 
The Jews and Jewish sympathizers pressed Truman to lift the arms 
embargo . President Truman, in a news conference on January 15, 1948 , 
stated that American troops would not be sent to Palestine to restore 
order becasue it was a United Nation affair. Robert Abercrombi Lovett , 
in a cabinet meeting on January 16, stated that a congressman from New 
York and David K. Niles had urged him by telephone to see that the arms 
embargo was lifted. On January 18, the Political Action Committee for 
Palestine, in an open letter to Truman, urged a modification of the arms 
embargo , a lend- lease arrangement with individuals for arms for protection 
against Arab attacks , and the support of a resolution for a United Nations 
police force in Palestine . Hundreds of letters arrived at the White 
House urging the President to take immediate action to help the Jews by 
21 raising the arms embargo . 
On February 11, Secretary of State Marshall stated that there had 
been no changes in American policy on Palestine. The following day 
Truman commented that the Government of the United States was still 
supporting the United Nations' settlement for Palestine. During a news 
conference Truman refused to indicate whether this were as far as he would 
21New York Times , January 16, 1948 , P• 4 ; January 19 , 1948, P• 3; 
J anuary 29 , 1948, p . 19 ; February 2, 1948 , P• 5; February 4 , 1948, P• 11; 
February 13 , 1948, p . 16 ; February 21 , 1948, P• l ; February 25 , 1948, 
p. 19 ; Forrestal Diaries , p . 361. 
go. This question was obviously the outgrowth of the opposition of the 
partition problem in the United Nations . The same day Marshall at a 
meeting of the National Security Council, outlined three alternative 
courses for the United States - abandoning support of the General 
Assembly's partition proposal , vigorously supporting the proposal with 
the use of American troops , or attempting to reshape the question, not 
abandoning the principle of partition, but adopting some temporary 
expedient like a trusteeship . 22 
On February 16 , the falestine Commission demanded a military 
f orce to carry out the partition plan. President Truman , instead of 
lifting the arms embargo , or using United States troops to enforce 
partition, appealed to the Arab states for moderation of violence and 
eventually peace in Palestine . Arab leaders stated that there would be 
no change in the Arab League's decision to use Arab armies if an United 
Nations police force was used to enforce partitioning . The Foreign 
Minister of Iraq stated that Truman ' s policy had starved the fire in 
Palestine , and it was up to Truman to put it out if peace was to prevail . 23 
General Alfred Maximiliam Gruenthal , in a meeting at the White 
House , stated that the British Government had 57 , 000 troops in Palestine. 
He added that it would take between 80 , 000 and 160 , 000 troops to enforce 
h U t N t · t· 1 24 t e ni ed ations par 1 ion proposa . Representative Lawrence Henry 
22New York Times , February 12, 1948, p . 10 ; February 13 , 1948, 
p . 6 ; For r estal Diaries , pp . 371-372. 
23New Yor k Times , February 17 , 1948, p . l ; February 18, 1948, P• 7. 
24Forres t al Diaries , P• 376 . 
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Smith, Republican of Wisconsin, in a telegram to Truman stated: 
Assumptions underlying the Palestine partition action are now 
found to be false. If the Security Council implements the As sembly 
recommendation for use of military force, it will mean war. The 
responsibility2~s yours. The American people do not want war over the situation. 
On February 24, the chairman of the United Nations Palestine 
Commission made a full oral supplementary report before the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. He pointed out that without the 
assistance of armed forces the task of implementing the Assembly's 
partition resolution was impossible. arren Robinson Austin, United 
States Representative in the Security Council, stated: 
The Security Council is authorized to take forceful measures with 
respect to Palestine to remove a threat to international peace. The 
Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council 
to enforce a political settlement whether it is pursuant to a recom-
mendation of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself. 
What this means is this: The Security Council, under the Charter, 
can take action to prevent aggression against alestine from out-
side. The .Security Council, by these same powers, can take action 
to prevent a threat to international peace and secur ity from in-
side Palestine. But this action must be direct~d solely to the 
maintenance of international peace. The Securi~y Council's action, 
in other w2gds, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing 
partition. 
President Truman, who the day before Austin's statement was in 
constant touch with Marshall, Austin, and Lovett, stated that Warren 
Austin's speech accurately explained the United States Government's 
25Lawrence Henry Smith, Republican Representative from 1lisconsin, 
to Harry S. Truman, Telegram, February 23, 1948; partially quoted in 
New York Times, February 24 , 1948, p. J. 
26united Nations. Security Council. Official Records [of the 
third year] (Lake Success, 1948), p. 267; Hereinafter cited as Official 
Record of the Security Council's Third Year. Bulletin, Vol. 18, March 
7, 1948-:-p~95-
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position on the Palestine problem. It appeared that President Truman 
was leaving fewer decisions to the State Department , which was emphasizing 
the limits of the charter. Truman still was not ready to answer under 
what circumstances, if any, American troops might be used. 27 
In New York City there was a certain dissatisfaction with Presi-
dent Truman 1 s handling of the Palestine problem. The Jews wanted the 
arms embargo lifted so they could defend their homeland. Two weeks 
later, on March 8, Truman declared that he would be a candidate for the 
Presidency if the Democrats wanted him. Truman stated that he would 
handle the Palestine problem in the light of the security of the United 
States and not in regard to politics. He further stated that he would 
support the decisions of the United Nations . 28 
On March 5, Warren Austin , before the Security Council , set forth 
a resolution which was adopted as follows: 
2. To call on the permanent members of the Council to consult 
·and; 
(a) To inform the Security Council regardin~ the situation with 
respect to Palestine and to make, as the result of such consultations, 
recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which 
the council might usefully give to the alestine Commission with a 
view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The 
Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on 
the results of their consultations within ten days. 
(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to 
report their conclusions as a matter of urgenC""J to the Council, 
together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council 
which they consider appropriate. 
27New York Times, February 24, 1948, p. 3; February 25, 1948, P• l; 
February 27, 1948,p:-}; March 2, 1948, P• 9. 
28New York Times, February 19, 1948, P• l; March 9, 1948, P• 1. 
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(c ) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory 
Power, and representatives of the principle communities of Palestine 
concerning the implementat~n of the General Assembly recommenda-
t ions of 29 November 1947. 
On March 17, Truman appeared before Congress with a request that 
Congress speedily complete its action on the European recovery program, 
pr omptly enact legislation for universal military training, and tem-
porarily reenact legislation for selective-service to maintain t he armed 
forces at "their authorized strength. " This action was an attempt to fur -
ther stop the Soviet Union's expansion in Eastern Europe and t he Near East .30 
The following day Chaim i eizmann talked with the President for 
almos t three- quarters of an hour . Truman assured him that no change in 
American policy was contemplated unless for the saving of bloodshed.31 
On March 19 , Warren Austin, before the Security Council , stated 
in relation to the resolution adopted 11arch 5 that: 
40 . 
The Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power , the Jewish Agency 
and the Arab Higher Committee has indicated that the partition plan 
cannot be implemented by peaceful means under prPsent conditions • •• 
In addition , my Government believes that a temporary trusteeship 
for Palestine should be established under t he Trusteeship Counci l of 
the United Nations to maintain -the peace and to afford t he Jews and 
Arabs of Palestine, who must live together , further opportunity to 
reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country. 
Such a United Nations trusteeship would , of course , be without 
prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement, 
which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, 
the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a 
trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. 
290fficial Record of the Security Council's Third Year , PP • 35-36 , 
J OCongr essional Record , 80th Congress , 2nd Session, PP • 2996- 2998. 
JlHarry s. Truman, Year s of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday and Company, 1946) , P• 161. 
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This would require an immediate special session of the General 
Assembly, which the Securit y Council might call under the terms of 
the Charter. Pending the convening of the special session of the 
General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should in-
struct the Palestine Commiss~2n to suspend its efforts to implement 
the proposed partition plan. 
Secret ary of State Marshall tried to clear up the assumption that 
this was a retreat in policy by stating that it was the only way to main-
tain peace and that the trusteeship would only be temporary . The United 
States Government was not going to act unilaterally in the matter . This 
appeared to offer a basis for a solution to meet the situation in Pales-
tine}3 
Many letters of protest arrived at the White House condemning 
Truman for the action which was taken. Democratic leaders stated that 
they would oppose his nomination unless he reversed the Palestine policy 
again. 34 On March 25 , Truman i ssued a statement regarding the United 
States position in the United Nations . 
3~his last proposition was not made into a formal proposal , 
but now it can be seen that the United States Government was trying to 
bog- down the machinery of the United Nations by consuming more time. 
Official Records of the Security Council's Third Year, pp . 157, 167; 
Bulletin, Vol. 18, March 28 , 1948, pp . 402 , 407; Lilienthal , What Price 
I srael? p . 77 , s tated that this shift in policy had taken on many points 
of view. It is interpreted as a retreat from the original partition 
scheme or t he State Department acted without Presidential approval . View 
held by Frank E. Manual , The Realities of American Palestine Relations 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press , 1949), P• 345. 
33Bull et in, Vol . 18 , March 28, 1948, P• 408. 
34New York Times , March 23 , 1948, p . 16; March 25 , 1948, P• 22 ; 
Wi l l iam F. Rosenblum, Pr esident of the Synagogue Council of America , to 
Harry s. Truman , March 25 , 19480 
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Such trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every 
effort to find a way to carry out partition by peaceful means. 
Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan 
but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termin-
ation of the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice 
the character of the final political settlement. It would establish 
the conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution •• 
American policy in this emergency pe5~od is based squarely upon 
the recognition of this inescapable fact. 
When asked later in the day at a news conference whether the United 
States Government would use American troops to enforce a United Nations 
settlement, he stated that he would cross that bridge when it was reached. 
James Forrestal, in a conversation with the President and Lovett, stated 
that the United States did not have forces available. The President 
stated that he did not want to make any firm commitment to send troops 
to Palestine.36 
On March JO, Warren Austin, before the Security Council, requested 
a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question 
of the future government of Palestine.37 The Secretary ~eneral, on April 1, 
summoned the second special session of the General Assembly to meet at 
Lake Success on April 16. On April 1, Austin then called upon the 
Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Jews 
and Arabs to save human life. 
35Bulletin, Vol. 18, April 4, 1948, P• 451. 
36New York Times , March 26, 1948, p. l; Forrestal Diaries, PP• 
405-406 . --
37official Records of the Security Council's Third Year, PP• 246-
248; Bulletin, Vol. 18, April 18, 1948, PP• 514-515. 
Two weeks after Austin's trusteeship proposal, Lessing Julius 
Rosenwald stated that trusteeship implemented by force, if necessary, 
would be better than the mistake of partitioning Palestine. He asked 
the Jews to stop the abuse of, and political threats against, Truman, 
Marshall, and Forrestal. Rosenwald stated that they were working on a 
complex problem.38 Chaim Weizmann, in a letter to Truman, said: 
Jews and Arabs are both mature for independence and are already 
obedient in a large degree to their own institutions, while t he 
central British Administration is in virtual collapse •••• It 
is proposed to institute a Trusteeship in a country threatened by 
foreign Arab aggression torn by internal warfare, and already 
moving inexorably towards Partition under a valid international 
resolution. The proposal is made without any assurance that a 
trustee is available, that Arabs or Jews will cooperate, that the 
General Assembly will approve an agreement or that any effective 
measure can be improvised by 11ay 15th •••• The choice for j~r 
people, Mr. President, is between Statehood and extermination. 
While the Security Council was attempting to maintain peace in 
Palestine, the General Assembly was considering the best form of 
temporary government to replace the British after their ma date ended. 
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On April 17, the Palestine Commission reported to the J eneral Assembly 
that in light of Arab hostility, lack of British co-operation, and 
failure of the United Nations to supply an armed force, it was impossible 
to implement the partition resolution. On April 20, Austin, before the 
First Committee, recommended a draft trusteeship agreement for Palestine 
similar to the City of Jerusalem Trusteeship adopted on March 10. This 
38New York Times, April 8, 1948, p. 8. 
39chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader, to Harry S. Truman, April 9, 
1948. 
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"temporary" trusteeship proposed to have an elected legislature, sub-
ordination of Jewish immigration to an agreement between Jews and Arabs, 
a police force in Palestine by members of the United Nations capable of 
supplying and financing the armed forces required. In an attempt to 
establish peace in Palestine, the Security Council, on April 23, es tab-
lished a Truce Commission in Palestine. This Commission was to keep the 
President of the Security Commission informed and to help in supervising 
the implementation of a trusteeship.40 
On April 22, two important statements were made. In a press 
conference President Truman stated that the United States Government 
was willing to provide troops in Palestine, if necessary, for aey 
international police force created by the United Nations. Second, 
Abba Silver told the First Committee that: 
15 May had been set as the date for the inauguration of a new 
order. Accordingly, on the following day a provisional J ewish 
Government would begin to function in accordance with the spirit 
of the United Nations resolution and the Jewish State would thus 
be a reality. Tar only threat to its existence JUld come from 
the Arab States. 
On April 28, President Truman appointed John H. Hilldring as a 
special assistant to Marshall in charge of Palestine affairs. Former 
400fficial Records of the Security Council's Third Year, pp. 32-
33; Bulletin, Vol. 18, May 9, 1948, p. 594. 
41united Nations. General Assembly. Main Committees [of the 
second special session] (Lake Success, 1948), pp. 46-47; 1~ew York Times, 
April 23, 1948, p. 4. The Zionists were now solidly behind a J ewish 
State on May 16. On March 21 the Jewish Agency stated that a Jewish 
State would be created and the World Zionist organization said the same 
on April 12. New York Times , March 22, 1948, P• l; April 13, P• 1. 
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Governor of New York Herbert Henry Lehman, after a talk with Truman, 
urged a trusteeship for Jerusalem, ultimate partition of Palestine , 
and a truce with an international police force to keep the peace.42 
On May 6, President Truman stated that the United States was 
doing everything possible through the United Nations to prevent blood-
shed in Palestine. Though the British were asked by the United Nations 
to keep troops in Palestine until May 25, Truman informed the newsmen at 
his press conference that the United States government had not asked the 
British to keep troops in Palestine. The British still planned to 
have their forces out by May 15. On May 7, thirty-six Republicans from 
the House of Representatives asked Truman to lift the arms embargo to 
Jewish forces in Palestine. They argued that the embargo should be 
lifted until the completion of a just truce or the withdrawal of Arab 
forces, and they advocated partition under the former United Nations 
4~ew York Times, May 5, 1948, p. 14; Harry Sacher, Israel: The 
Establishment of.§: State (New York: British Book Center, 1952), p . 107, 
stated that the appointment of Hilldring shows that Truman is again 
assuming major responsibility from the State Department. Freda Kirchwey, 
"Partition Begins at Home," The Nation , Vol. 166, May 8, 1948, pp. 492-
493, stated: "It is no secret that the President is both worried and 
ashamed over the part he has playedo Some modification of American policy 
is almost certain; otherwise General John H. Hilldring would never have 
been put in the place of Loy Henderson as chief advisor to the Secretary 
of State on Palestine affairs. Hilldring helped nurse partition through 
the Assembly last November. He thoroughly believed the plan is the best 
solution available. Above all, he has steadfastly opposed the oil 
diplomacy of the Henderson-Wadsworth clique. That Hilldring , in spite of 
ill-health and firm resolve to refuse further State Department assign-
ments, has come back to take charge of Palestine policy is a hopeful 
sequel to, and undoubtedly in part a consequence of, the Jewish successes 
in Palestine." Truman [in an interview December 16, 1959] actually wanted 
somebody who viewed Palestine as he did. 
agreement. Rabbi Samuel Thurman of St . Louis , who called on the Presi-
dent, believed that the President still favored partition. Truman in-
formed him that the most important consideration was the avoidance of 
bloodshed.43 
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On May 10, President Truman received a letter from Freda Kirchwey 
and Bartley C. Crum giving evidence that the British were working with 
the Arabs . They pointed out that the British Government was supplying 
the Arabs with arms and ammunition, allowing the breakdown of British 
authority to give the abs a military advantage , and preventing the 
United Nations from implementing partition. They claimed the British 
would rather have the oil of the Arabs and control of the Suez 
Canal . 44 
On May 12, Marshall conferred with Truman about the problem 
raised by the ending of the British Iandate in Palestine . It was rumored 
around Washington that ~arshall had sent a personal message to David 
Ben- Gurion, the future Premier of the State of Isrci.-.:l, but the details 
were secret. 45 
As the end of the Mandate drew near , Chaim Weizmann, in his 
book , stated: 11 I strengthened our contacts with our friends in Washington, 
and affirmed my intentions of going ahead with a bid for recognition of 
43New York Times, May 7, 1948, P• 8; May 8 , 1948, P• 4 . 
44Freda Kirchwey and Bartley C. Crum , former member of the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry, to Harry S. Truman , May 10 , 1948. 
45 ew York Times, hay 13 , 1948, P • 7. 
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of the few questions in the United Nations which Soviet Russiaagreed 
with in principle with the United States on partitioning. Not only had 
the United States Government been brought into a position equal with 
Britain, but the Soviet Union was drawn into the responsibility. With 
the .Arabs moving further into the British camp, the United States was 
able to give more support to Zionism without the loss of either Jews 
or Arabs to communism. In addition, the Arab countries were promised 
large sums of money for development of their countries. The United 
Nations partition proposal had been along the same lines as that of the 
Jewish Agency. Partition could possibly have been implemented with the 
use of troops, but the United States Government would not allow this 
until they were sure they would be supporting a Jewish state . The in-
troduction of Trusteeship and the calling of the General Assembly to 
discuss a probable truce were used as stalling tactics by the United 
States. Great Britain, while not voting in United Nations except when 
Jews and .Arabs agreed, supported the bogging down and Lnactivity of the 
United Nations to implement a solution. 
The United States Government was interested in alestine as a 
solution for the displaced Jews of Europe, and gaining of American 
public opinion for the Democratic Party. Thus, when Truman recognized 
the State of Israel single-handedly, he put the United Nations partition 
plan into effect. 
CHAPTER VI 
DE FACTO RECOGNITION AND RETROSPECT 
OF THE TRUMAN AIMINISTRATION 
In an attempt to find a just solution, Britain and the United 
States investigated the situation which proved to be almost insolvable. 
The United States , led by Truman, were now being pulled into the Near 
East turmoil, but the United States refused at this time to assume joint 
responsibility. Thus Britain, after thirty years without an adequate 
solution, turned the problem over to the United Nations where the United 
States, Britain, and Soviet Russia had joint responsibility in attempting 
to find a solution. 
After Britain announced the approaching end of her Mandate , debate 
in the United Nations slowed down. In an attempt to preserve peace at 
the time and after the Mandate ended, the United States p oposed a Truce 
Commission which was adopted. A proposal for tempora.cy trusteeship over 
Palestine was being debated when Truman recognized the New State . 
Proceedings temporarily broke down, but the ground work was laid for 
the saving of lives. The road was still open for American troops under 
United Nations control to enforce the November Partition Resolution . 
At eleven minutes after six on May 14, 1948 (Washington time), 
Presidential Secretary Charles G. Ross handed the press Truman 's 
statement of recognition as follows: 
This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been 
proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the 
provisional Government thereof. 
FORSYTH LIBD \ y 
FORT HAY K tf' .., n _ v - ~L 
The Unit ed States recognizes the provisiorlfl government as the 
de facto authority of the new St ate of Israel . 
Ross then stated that the creation of the Jewish state and subsequent 
recognition by the United States would in no way lessen the efforts of 
the United States Government to bring about a truce between Arabs and 
Jews . He hoped that Israel would join with the Security Council in 
redoubling efforts to end the fighting . 2 
The President of the United States has the sole discretion to 
extend recognition although he may ask the help and advice of both the 
·Department of State and the Congress . Truman made no distinction in 
the two theories of recognition - de facto and de jure . From 1793 
to the }ilson Administration , the United States usually gave de facto 
recognition to new governments as soon as they were in control of the 
state. The v ilson Administration granted de .jure recognition only to 
legitimate gover nments , thus denying the right of recognition to 
revolutionary governments . However , Truman in an inte view with the 
author stated "recognition is recognition. 113 
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1United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol . 18, May 23 , 
1948 , p . 673 ; New York Times, May 15, 1948, p . 1 . Truman changed the 
wording of an earlier draft which read "This Government has been in-
formed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine , and 
recognition has been requested by the Government thereof . 
"The Unit ed States recognizes the provisional government as the 
de facto authority of the new Jewish State. 11 Truman Papers o Harry S. 
Tr uman Library. Her einafter all letters and telegrams are in the Tru.man 
Papers . 
¾Jew York Times , May 15, 1948 , P• 1. 
3Harry s . Truman , Interview in Independence , Mi ssouri , December 14, 
1959. 
The prompt recogni tion of the State of Israel by the Government 
of the United States was seen by some as another reversal in American 
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f · 1· 4 I h b oreign po icy. n is ook Truman stated that recognition was a matter 
of standing policy. 
I had often talked with my advisers about the course of action 
we would take once partition had come about , and it wa~ always under-
stood that eventually we would recognize any- responsible government 
the Jews might set up . Partition was not taking place in exactly 
the peaceful manner I had hoped , to be sure , but the fact was that 
the Jews were controllin~ the area in which their people lived and 
that they were ready to administer and to defend it . On the other 
hand , I was well aware that some of the State Department "experts" 
would want to block recognition of a Jewish state . 
Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel , 
however , I decided to move at once and give American reco~nition 
to the new nation. I instructed a member of my staff to communi-
cate my decisions to the St ate Department and prepare it for tr3ns -mission to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations in New York . 
Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg of ··1ichigan, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , in the following statement 
viewed recognition of the State of Israel as a logical step to fill the 
vacuum created by the ending of the Mandate . 
The prompt recognition of the provisional government as the 
de facto authority in the new state of Israel is the lof,ical and 
proper step following the termination of the British mandate. 
It takes account of the reality that no other authority can 
4Freda Ki rchwey, "America and Israel , " The Nat ion (New York) , 
Vol . 166 , May 22 , 1948, pp . 565-566; Hal Lehrman , "What United States 
Support Means ; Behind washingt on ' s New Decisiveness , " Commentary , 
Vol . 5, J une , 19~8, pp . 485-492 stated that this was another reversal 
in Truman ' s policy back to partitioning. 
5Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City , N.Y.: 
Doubleday and Company- , 1956'f:-p. i64~ James Vincent Forr,stal , The 
Forrest al Diaries , ed. by Walter Mills (New York : The Viki ng Press , 
1951, p . 440 s t ated that the decision of r ecognition was contemplated 
earlier. 
fill what otherwise would be a cruel and dangerous vacuum in this 
area of Palestine . 
It responds to a basic decision of the United Nations taken at 
our instance . It is positive action after many months of critical 
and unhanpy indecision. 
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If the present course of the United States is followed by other 
Governments , I am unable to believe that the parties in controversy 
cannot be successfully summoned to the bar of the United Nations in 
behalf of an urgent truce . 
The restoration of law and order and an enviornment6of peace is indispensable to the best evolution for all concerned. 
While few messages of opposition were sent to Truman , telegrams 
from Jewish sources arrived almost immediately at the White House praising 
the President . Stephen Samuel Wise and others of the American Jewish 
·congress had a telegram in the White House within a half hour after 
recognition , praising Truman for the honor he brought to the United States 
from Jews and other nations . Frank Goldman , President of B'nai B' rith , 
claimed that it was in keeping with the 4merican tradition and that 
thousands upon thousands would bless him . Bartley Cavanaugh Crum and 
Frank W. Buxton, two American members of the Anglo-Ame ican Committee of 
Inquiry, thanked President Truman for the "magnifieent job 11 in recognizing 
the State of Israel . 7 
6Text in New York Times , May 15, 1948, P• J . 
?Stephen Samuel Wise , President of the American Jewish Congress , 
and others , to Harry S. Truman, President of the United States , Telegram, 
May 14, 1948; Frank Goldman, President of B' nai B'rith, to Harry S. 
Truman, Telegram , May 14, 1948; Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, former member of 
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry , to Harry S. Truman, Telegram, 
May 16, 1948; Frank W. Buxton, former member of the Anglo- American 
Committee of Inquiry, to Harry S. Truman, Telegram, May 15, 1948. The 
latter two telegrams, and the report of the Anglo-American Committee , 
indicated that the Committee leaned towards a Jewish position. In a 
letter (Bartley c. Crum to Harry S. Truman, June 10, 1946) Crum stated 
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Truman appeared to have moved contrary to the promise to the 
Arabs on advanced consultation. However, if the Jews were in control of 
the present state of Israel, then a recognition of that state would not 
change the 11basic situation" or require advanced consultation. As a 
result of the ending of the Mandate, the Arab countries started moving 
Arab troops into Palestine. The Arabs now viewed the State of Israel 
as an imperialistic state of the United States. 
On 11ay 16, Truman stated that he considered lifting t he United 
States Government's arms embargo against the entire Near East and the 
following day the Senate considered lifting the arms embargo for the 
benefit of the Jews alone, but the matter was dropped . On May 25, 
Truman proposed a loan to the State of Israel for arms and reconstruction. 
Three days later, Truman stated that the United Nations was discussing 
raising the arms embargo which they had requested in the fall of 1947. 
Both President Trwnan and Secretary of State George Catlett ¥.arshall 
were leaving many details of American policy in the hands of 
Robinson Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations. 8 
Harry s. Truman felt compelled to fulfill the Jewish plank of 
the 1944 Democratic platform. Being led by American public opinion and 
11Because of your strong and continued backing, the report was unanimous. 
Wherever I have spoken to audiences, I have told them that whatever the 
Committee accomplished was due, in major degree , to the support we re-
ceived from you . 11 In addition, James Grover McDonald, another member of 
the Committee, became the first A.~bassador to the State of Israel for 
which the Jews were grateful. 
8New York Times, :May 16, 1948, p . l; May 18, 1948 , p . 4; May 22, 
1948, p. 2; May 27 , 1948, p. l; May 28, 1945, p. 1. 
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Congress to help the Jews , the President had moved further into a Zionist 
position. The Arab countries , State Department, and oil interests 
attempted in vain to slow the Jewish aspiration for a National Homelando 
Immediately after the war the economic and strategic location of Palestine 
had taken the question out of the hands of Congress. Truman, while 
gaining support for himself and the Democratic Party in the coming 
elections, made broad statements in supnort of Zionism and at the same 
time told the Arabs that nothing would be done without advanced con-
sultation. Therefore, Truman had attempted to solve the European refugee 
problem, he created the State of Israel as a refuge for European Jews , 
as a bulwark against communism in the Near East , as an important strategic 
and economic state in the Near East favoring the Jest, and as an attempt 
to fill a vacuum created by the termination of the Aandate, all at the 
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